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CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CULTURAL RIGHTS UNDER
ISLAMIC LAW
Eleni Polymenopoulou*
ABSTRACT
This Article examines the position of the Islamic legal tradition on arts and
cultural heritage, including its pitfalls, and argues that a better understanding
of Muslim state practice is needed to enhance the protection of cultural rights
in the Muslim world. This can further facilitate collaboration between Muslim
states and inter-governmental bodies working in the field of culture; implement
better accountability mechanisms under international criminal law, as well as;
to contribute to the fight against terrorism. In addition, the author submits that
Islamic law is not necessarily an appropriate platform to enhance cultural rights
and cultural heritage in the Muslim world. This is because of the nature of the
Islamic legal tradition, which contains an extraordinary number of legal tools
capable of setting aside obscure and anachronistic views in favor of
modernization, yet is equally full of contradictions and ambiguities. The high
complexity and diversity of possible solutions under Islamic law may inhibit the
implementation of appropriate cultural policies on the protection of cultural
heritage and the arts. The emphasis therefore should be on Muslim state
practice, including in particular the practice of the rightly guided Caliphs whose
palaces are evidence of tolerance and broadmindedness; contemporary Muslim
state practice of those Muslim states that strive to promote cultural rights; and
best practices initiated by Arab-Muslim organizations and institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Twenty years have passed since the decision of the Taliban to demolish the
two giant Buddhas of the Bamiyan valley.1 During these years, the protection of
cultural heritage and cultural rights has gained substantial momentum. The
damage of Syrian, Iraqi, and Libyan heritage by the Islamic State (ISIS) was
arguably a catalyst in making culture a matter of global security.2 Images and
videos of ISIS propaganda, such as those depicting militants demolishing
artifacts in the Mosul Museum;3 the explosion of ancient temples in Palmyra;4

1
Ernesto Ottone R., Commemorating 20 Years Since the Destruction of Two Buddhas of Bamiyan,
Afghanistan, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CTR. (Mar. 11, 2021), https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/2253 (referring to the
Warsaw Recommendation on Recovery and Reconstruction of Cultural Heritage).
2
Waseem Ahmad Qureshi, The Protection of Cultural Heritage by International Law in Armed Conflict,
15 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 63, 68 (2017).
3
See, e.g., Kareem Shaheen, ISIS Fighters Destroy Ancient Artefacts at Mosul Museum, GUARDIAN
(Feb. 26, 2015, 4:26 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/isis-fighters-destroy-ancientartefacts-mosul-museum-iraq (featuring videos of ISIS militants destroying artifacts).
4
See ISIS Releases Images Showing Destruction of Palmyra Temple, NBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 2015),
https://www.nbcnews.com/nightly-news/video/isis-releases-images-showing-destruction-of-palmyra-temple512965187705.
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and the destruction of antiquities in Nimrud, Iraq,5 have been posted, reposted,
and hash-tagged online thousands of times.
Hence, cultural rights and cultural heritage are now part of the agenda not
only of UNESCO (the U.N. specialized agency for culture, science, and the
arts),6 but also of the political bodies of the United Nations. In 2016, the U.N.
Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on cultural rights (and the protection
of cultural heritage) “[r]ecognizing that safeguarding the enjoyment of cultural
rights may form a crucial part of the response to many current global challenges,
including the scourge of terrorism” and “call[ing] upon all States to respect,
promote and protect the right of everyone to take part in cultural life, including
the ability to access and enjoy cultural heritage[.]”7 In 2017, the U.N. High
Commissioner on Human Rights organized a panel on cultural rights,8 and the
U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 2347 condemning the destruction and
smuggling of cultural heritage by terrorist groups.9
At present, there is no doubt about the impact of these incidents on peace
and security around the world, especially in the Middle East.10 The strategic use

5
Kristin Romey, Why ISIS Hates Archaeology and Blew Up Ancient Iraqi Palace, NAT’L GEO. (Apr.
14, 2015), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/150414-why-islamic-state-destroyed-assyrianpalace-nimrud-iraq-video-isis-isil-archaeology.
6
See Irina Georgieva Bokova, Terrorists Are Destroying Our Cultural Heritage. It’s Time to Fight Back,
WORLD ECON. F. (Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/terrorists-are-destroying-our-cultureheritage-it-s-time-to-fight-back. See generally Responding to Cultural Cleansing, Preventing Violent
Extremism, U.N. EDUC. SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. [UNESCO], https://en.unesco.org/events/responding-culturalcleansing-preventing-violent-extremism (last visited Sept. 6, 2021).
7
Human Rights Council Res. 33/20 (alternation in original) (requesting the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights “[t]o convene . . . a one-day intersessional seminar on ways to prevent, contain and/or mitigate
the detrimental impact of the damage to or destruction of cultural heritage on the enjoyment of human rights,
including cultural rights by all, and on best practices in this regard”).
8
U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Intersessional Seminar on Cultural Rights and the Protection
of Cultural Heritage: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/37/29 (Dec. 27, 2017).
9
See S.C. Res. 2347, ¶ 1 (Mar. 24, 2017) (condemning the “destruction of cultural heritage . . . as well
as the looting and smuggling of cultural property . . . by terrorist groups”); see also S.C. Res. 2199, ¶¶ 16–17,
23 (Feb. 12, 2015) (aiming at blocking ISIS, ISIL, ANF, and Al-Qaeda’s financial resources). Prior to issuing
Resolution 2347, the Security Council had also issued a variety of resolutions on Mali and created the U.N.
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, aimed at the protection of heritage, among other
things. See generally Qureshi, supra note 2, at 81; Lassana Cissé, The Ratification and Implementation of the
(1999) Second Protocol of the 1954 Convention in Mali During Armed Conflict, in PROTECTING CULTURAL
PROPERTY 82–86 (2020).
10
See generally MARINA LOSTAL ET AL., CULTURE UNDER FIRE: ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS AND
CULTURAL HERITAGE IN WARTIME 13–26 (2018); Kristin Hausler, Culture Under Attack: The Destruction of
Cultural Heritage by Non-State Armed Groups, 2 SANTANDER ART & CULTURE L. REV. 117, 118–41 (2015);
Emma Cunliffe et al., The Destruction of Cultural Property in the Syrian Conflict: Legal Implications and
Obligations, 23 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 1, 19–20 (2016) (relating to Da’esh).
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of destroying and smuggling cultural heritage is also by now well documented.11
Also, it is well known that the smuggling of antiquities and subsequent art trade
has been an essential aspect of ISIS financing.12 Muslim communities around
the world condemn ISIS ideology as an “ideology of oppression[.]”13 Even so,
these incidents have kindled a negative, popular stereotype about the legitimacy
of the arts in the Muslim world.14 The alleged hostile position of Islam toward
the arts and cultural heritage creates confusing representations of Islam in the
West, displacing the emphasis from other pervasive security issues as well as
the fact that cultural terrorism in the Muslim world primarily targets Muslims
themselves.15 Even worse, stereotypical readings of these incidents and violence
perpetrated by extremists nourish the erroneous hypothesis of the supposed
“clash of civilizations” suggested by Huntington shortly after the end of the Cold
War.16 In turn, this exacerbates the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment, creating a
backlash against Muslim minorities in the West. As a result, an inverse trend has
emerged, especially within the United Nations, to fight Islamophobia and hateful
representations of Islam. Last but not least, the violence perpetrated by jihadis
11
See Matthew Clapperton et al., Iconoclasm and Strategic Thought: Islamic State and Cultural Heritage
in Iraq and Syria, 93 INT’L AFFS. 1205, 1205–31 (2017) (“The destruction of cultural heritage in Syria and Iraq
by the group calling itself Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Islamic State) is neither random collateral damage nor
necessarily an exercise in barbarism.”); Benjamin Isakhan, How to Interpret ISIS’s Heritage Destruction,
CURRENT HIST. 344, 344–49 (2018); Benjamin Isakhan & José Antonio González Zarandona, Layers of
Religious and Political Iconoclasm Under the Islamic State: Symbolic Sectarianism and Pre-Monotheistic
Iconoclasm, 24 INT’L J. HERITAGE STUD. 1, 1–2, 11 (2018).
12
Cf. Qureshi, supra note 2, at 68. In 2015, the U.S. State Department indicatively estimated that ISIS
“took in at least $1.25 million from the sale of items looted from just one archaeological site[.]” Isakhan, supra
note 11, at 347 (noting that “[t]he funds generated from the looting of antiquities across Iraq and Syria were used
by ISIS to finance its state, buy weapons and other equipment, carry out mass attacks on local communities, and
strengthen its operational capacity to organize terrorist attacks across the world.”).
13
E.g., Linah Alsaafin, Reclaiming Mosul’s Vibrant Culture After ISIL, AL JAZEERA (Oct. 15, 2017),
https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/10/15/reclaiming-mosuls-vibrant-culture-after-isil.
14
Cf. Trinidad Rico, Heritage Studies and Islam: A Crisis of Representation, 51 REV. MIDDLE E. STUD.
183, 186. See generally Trinidad Rico, Islamophobia and the Location of Heritage Debates in the Arabian
Peninsula, in CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA: DEBATES, DISCOURSES AND PRACTICES 19–30
(Karen Exell & Trinidad Rico eds., 2017).
15
See, e.g., Qureshi, supra note 2, at 65; U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., 2019
Report on International Religious Freedom: Saudi Arabia 16 (2019) (noting attacks against Shia mosques by
Da’esh and ISIS); U.N. Office of the High Comm’r, Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage as a Violation
of Human Rights in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/CulturalRights/
DestructionHeritage/NGOS/ADHRB.pdf (noting that “[s]ince 1925, the Government of Saudi Arabia has
destroyed about 98 percent of religious and historic sites in the country” and discussing the destruction of Shia
minorities’ religious shrines, tombs, and other heritage); Karima Bennoune (Special Rapporteur in the Field of
Cultural Rights), Cultural Rights, U.N. Doc. A/71/317 (Aug. 9, 2016); Lamya Khalidi, The Destruction of Yemen
and Its Cultural Heritage, 49 INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 735, 736; cf. Robert Bevan, The Origins of Cultural
Protection, in IN HARM’S WAY 8, 12 (2017) (discussing Da’esh policies that destroy minority cultural sites,
especially the Yazidis).
16
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFFS. 22, 22–49 (1993).
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has been an impediment in finding common grounds between Islam and the
West.
This Article suggests that a better understanding of the Sharia is needed to
enhance the protection of cultural rights in the Muslim world. A better reading
of the Sharia’s position on arts and cultural heritage, including its pitfalls, could
contribute to inhibiting extremism in the cultural sphere and fostering
collaboration with governmental and non-governmental entities in the ArabMuslim world. The Sharia contains a number of elements that could be used to
enhance the protection of heritage and enable Muslim countries to assume a
better role in fostering and safeguarding arts and culture. At the same time,
however, a number of contradictions and the fear of extremist interpretations
inhibit international courts and tribunals from referring to Sharia-law sources
and their extremely rich jurisprudence when dealing with cultural matters. Thus,
emphasis should also be placed on Muslim state practice. For example, the
practice of the arts during the great Caliphs’ rule of the Muslim world, as will
be discussed below, is especially revealing with respect to artistic freedom. In
addition, modern Muslim state practice shows extraordinary engagement with
all aspects of arts and cultural life, substantial contributions for the enhancement
of cultural heritage at the international level, and expansion of cultural tourism
and booming art markets. This is the case even for strict Sharia-compliant states
such as Saudi Arabia, which is briefly studied in this Article as an example.
In terms of structure, this Article is split into four parts. Part I offers a brief
overview of the underpinning elements and principles of Islamic law, detailing
its richness, flexibility, and diversity. This general overview may be helpful to
the reader who is not familiar with Islamic law, as it details the multiplicity of
tools available to contemporary Muslim jurists who face matters related to art,
cultural rights, and cultural heritage. Part II provides an examination of the
sources of Islamic law, specifically in relation to arts and cultural heritage,
referring to concepts and principles that could be relevant in controversies
involving the destruction of cultural heritage.17 In this section, this Article
emphasizes the highly complex dialectic between divine sources and human
reasoning in Islamic thought, and contrasts both with the practice of the first
Caliphs regarding the preservation of cultural heritage. Part III explains that this
complex dialectic may be precisely one of the reasons why international bodies

17
Due to space and language limitations, this section does not aim to provide an exhaustive analysis of
the Islamic jurisprudence on cultural heritage, nor detail human-rights or humanitarian-law rules from the
perspective of the Sharia. Rather, it aims to establish the astonishing amount of diversity of views, teachings,
and schools of Islamic law (which are at times contradictory).
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are generally hesitant to refer to Islamic law in the context of international
dispute settlement, including disputes pertinent to cultural-rights violations and
the destruction of heritage. This part does highlight, however, that taking Islamic
law into greater account may have certain benefits for a more effective
protection of arts and cultural heritage in the Muslim world, especially in terms
of dialogue with Non-State Actors (NSAs). In Part IV, this Article provides
alternatives in approaching the Muslim perspective on cultural-heritage law that
is based primarily on state practice in matters related to artistic freedom and
cultural rights, drawing particularly from the practice of Gulf States, especially
Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This Article concludes that it is
important for Muslim writers and organizations to oppose the extremist, fanatic,
and archaic interpretations of Islam, and that it is equally important for
international bodies and agencies such as UNESCO to refer to modern Muslim
state practice.
I.

EXPLORING THE NATURE AND DIVERSITY OF THE ISLAMIC LEGAL
TRADITION

The Sharia encompasses the totality of human life. It consists of a body of
detailed rules that lead Muslims on the path to God.18 Most of these rules are
laid down in the Qur’an, which literally means the Word of God, as revealed to
Prophet Muhammad. The Qur’an therefore is the primary source of the Sharia—
the revelation starts with the imperative ‘ikra,’ which means “to read.” The
Qur’an describes itself as a “guidance” for humankind19 and is itself a piece of
literature. It contains a number of stories and parables of theological nature that
have been revealed to the Prophet. Amidst these stories, which are primarily of
a theological nature, one may also be able to deduce rules of normative content.
These rules are generally split into two categories.20 The first, ibadat, refers to
Muslims’ duties vis-à-vis the community and God (praying, fasting, pilgrimage,
etc.) as well as aspects of daily life as precise as greetings, ritual observances,
and hygiene.21 The second, mu’amalat, refers to transactions and other legal
issues common in both civil and common law within areas such as family law,

18
The term occurs only once in the Qur’an, designating a “divinely appointed path.” QUR’AN 45:18
(“Now We have set you O Prophet on the Way of faith [Shari’a]. So follow it . . . .”) (alteration in original); see
ABDULLAH SAEED, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ISLAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO KEY DEBATES BETWEEN ISLAMIC LAW
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2018).
19
QUR’AN 2:185.
20
Gamal Moursi Badr, Islamic Law: Its Relation to Other Legal Systems, 26 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 187, 188
(1978).
21
Id.
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inheritance, contracts, criminal law, and legal procedure.22 From over 6000
verses of the Qur’an, only about 200 possess a purely legal content,23 including
rules about jihad (jus ad bellum) and the use of armed force (jus in bello).24 Both
types of rules follow the values of Islam, dividing conduct into six categories:
(1) forbidden (haram); (2) obligatory (wajib); (3) permitted (mubah); (4)
recommended (muhtasab); (5) disapproved (makruh); and (6) reprimandable, or
indifferent/of no legal interest.25
The second source of the Sharia is the Sunna. The Sunna is based on the
exemplary nature of the Prophet’s life—what he did, said, or approved. It
includes the traditions, sayings, and deeds of the Prophet (hadiths),26 arguably
also narrations about the Prophet and his companions (al akhbar), and Islamic
traditions reported by the companions of the Prophet (al athaar).27 Six major
hadith collections were compiled in the third century after the Hijrah, which
remain canonical for Sunni Muslims.28 The soundness and validity of a hadith
is based on the concept of consensus of the Muslim ummah.29 There is a long
and heated debate over the authenticity of hadiths and a variety of theories on
transmission of hadiths have been developed.30
Islamic law, however, is not confined, nor is it based solely upon the divine
Sharia. Early jurists who lived in the first centuries after the Prophet in the
Arabian Peninsula developed a highly complex and sophisticated Islamic
jurisprudence known as the fiqh. The fiqh is based not only on the revealed
22

Id.
Id.; M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE SHARIʿA AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN TIME OF WAR AND PEACE
23–24 (2013); N.J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 12–13 (1964) (noting, however, that these verses are
eighty in number).
24
BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 198; see Karima Bennoune, Note, As-Salamu Alaykum? Humanitarian
Law in Islamic Jurisprudence, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 613–42 (1994); Onder Bakircioglu, A Socio-Legal
Analysis of the Concept of Jihad, 59 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 413, 416–19 (2010) [hereinafter The Concept of
Jihad]. See generally ONDER BAKIRCIOGLU, ISLAM AND WARFARE: CONTEXT AND COMPATIBILITY WITH
INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (2014).
25
WAEL B. HALLAQ, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 20 (2009); Badr, supra note 20, at 188.
26
HALLAQ, supra note 25, at 16; JOHN L. ESPOSITO, ISLAM: THE STRAIGHT PATH 104 (5th ed. 2016);
Anver M. Emon, Shari‘a and the Modern State, in ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 52,
54 (Anver M. Emon et al. eds., 2012).
27
Taha Jabir al-Alwani, Fatwa Concerning the United States Supreme Courtroom Frieze, 15 J.L. &
RELIGION 1, 1, 3 (2000).
28
BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 33; Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Shari’ah, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
ISLAM AND POLITICS 7–26 (John L. Esposito and Emad El-Din Shahin eds., 2013).
29
HALLAQ, supra note 25, at 17, 21; ESPOSITO, supra note 26, at 107–08; H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL
TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 207 (5th ed. 2014) (noting consensus is based on
a hadith that states “My people will never agree to error”) (emphasis added).
30
ESPOSITO, supra note 26, at 105–06; HALLAQ, supra note 25, at 17–19; Emon, supra note 26, at 57–
58.
23
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sources (Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions), but also on individual human
reasoning (ra’y) and non-revealed sources. The non-revealed sources include
both methodological tools and juristic principles (usul al fiqh). Assuming that
Islamic law is a tree, and the fiqh its branches, the usul therefore is the “roots”
of jurisprudence.31 The principles of the usul “rank[] the sources of law, their
interaction, interpretation and application”32 and function as legal formulas
conferring authority to offer legal reasoning. Thus, the methodology of the usul
may give rise to several varieties of construction including the following: ijma
(consensus of opinion), qiyas (analogical deduction/reasoning by analogy),33
istihsan (juristic preference),34 istihsab (presumption of continuity), istislah
(public interest), and maslaha (valid ways to serve the public interest).35
The more weight one grants to the fiqh and the usul, the more possible it will
be for teachers, judges, muftis, and imams to use human ability to reason and
expand further on contemporary matters with a view toward finding plausible
solutions. A good illustration of this is the ijma, which is also considered the
third source of Islamic law in Sunni jurisprudence.36 The exact legal value of the
ijma is the object of heated debates among Islamic law scholars. Some authors
emphasize the role of the ijma as acceptable customary practice and eventually
also give more space to jurists to minimize the effect of isolated and conservative
traditions.37 In fact, even in medieval years, there were authors praising the
significance of the ijma as human legal reasoning; for example, al-Qarafi (7 AH–
13 CE) presumed that the ijma prevailed even over the Qur’an and the Sunna.38
In contrast, Kamali, one of the most influential scholars on the usul, argues that
“[s]overeignty in Islam is the prerogative of Almighty God alone[,]” that ijma

31
MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 12 (3d ed. 2005); see also
HALLAQ, supra note 25, at 16, 22–27. See generally WAEL B. HALLAQ, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LEGAL THEORIES:
AN INTRODUCTION TO SUNNĪ UṢŪL AL-FIQH (1999); Emon, supra note 26, at 58; BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at
49–50.
32
BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 40.
33
Qiyas are secondary compared to the primary sources and are generally acceptable insofar as they are
compliant with Islamic fundamental precepts. See KAMALI, supra note 31, at 197–203, 286 (“Notwithstanding
the absence of a clear authority for qiyās in the Qur’ān, the ‘ulamā’ of the four Sunni schools and the Zaydi
Shī’ah have validated qiyās and quoted several Qur’ānic passages in support of their views.”).
34
Istihsan is accepted primarily by Hanafis and Hanbalis. It is essentially the ability to depart from an
existing law, enabling the jurist to prefer one solution over another when he or she feels that the result will be
unfair. See id. at 6, 363–64 (noting, however, that istihsan is only permissible when serving a higher objective
and must therefore be given preference over the existing law that is deemed unfair, and also that jurists have
been reluctant to perform istihsan).
35
Id. at 16–17.
36
GLENN, supra note 29, at 199–200 (noting this may appear awkward in the eyes of the Western jurist).
37
COULSON, supra note 23, at 72, 88–89.
38
Ahmad Hasan, The Argument for the Authority of Ijmā, 10 ISLAMIC STUD. 39, 39 (1971).
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can never override the Qur’an and the Sunna,39 and that the difference between
revealed and non-revealed sources is precisely that “[t]he legislative organ of an
Islamic state . . . cannot abrogate the Qur’an or the Sunnah[.]”40 Another
example is istihsan (juristic preference), which is accepted primarily by Hanafis
and Hanbalis, and essentially denotes the ability of the jurist to depart from an
existing law, enabling the jurist to prefer one solution over another when he or
she feels that the result will be unfair.41 This principle of Islamic law effectively
functions in much the same way as the common law concept of equity.42
In addition, the fiqh seldom provides solutions based on the Qur’an or the
Sunna alone, as legal rules in the Qur’an are applied differently in the context
of civil and criminal law: as either torts or criminal offenses.43 Furthermore, in
the context of public international law analogies may also be found between
customary law and the Sunna. This is true in respect to treaties concluded
between Muslims or non-Muslims as well as the authority of juristic opinions,
commentaries, and “utterances . . . of the Caliphs[,]” some of which have been
cited by reference to Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).44
Thus, to formulate a legal opinion (fatwa) on a certain matter, contemporary
Muslim jurists (fuqaha), judges (qadis), muftis, and imams may refer not only
to the revealed sources, but also largely to the fiqh. In its early years of formation
following the Prophet Muhammad’s death, the fiqh was also influenced by
factors external to Islam and incorporated a variety of elements of Talmudic,
Roman, Roman Provincial, Byzantine Canon, Persian Sassanian, and Arab tribal

39
KAMALI, supra note 31, at 16–17 (“[A]though it may abrogate a law which is based on maslahah or
istihsan . . . ijma[] is subservient to divine revelation and can never overrule the explicit injunctions of the Qur’an
and Sunnah.”).
40
Id. at 16.
41
See id. at 233–34.
42
Cf. Lawrence Rosen, Equity and Discretion in a Modern Islamic Legal System, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV.
217 (1980).
43
Coulson refers to the examples of drinking wine and the prohibition of usury. See COULSON, supra
note 23, at 12–13. Both are considered forbidden (haram) under Islamic law in the same terms. See id. Among
the two, only the first became a criminal offense originally punishable by flogging. Id. The other remained a
purely civil matter, giving rise to an illegal transaction or an illegal contract. See id.
44
Bennoune, supra note 24, at 613–14 (citing MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM
(1955)). References to Islamic law in the jurisprudence of the ICJ, however, have been scarce, save for few
noticeable exceptions. See, e.g., Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S.
v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J. 40, ¶ 86 (May 24, 1980) (referring to the concept of aman (safe passage) under
Islamic law and its application to diplomats and emissaries); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Protection of Diplomats
Under Islamic Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 609 (1980). See generally CHRISTOPHER G. WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC
JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1988).
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and customary laws.45 Throughout the first three centuries after the Hegira and
until the recording of the hadiths, most of what constituted the corpus of Islamic
law were circumscribed by reference to the traditions of the Prophet and the
practice of his companions. Traditionalists, however, insisted that the primary
sources (i.e., the Qur’an and the Sunna) prevailed and saw references to personal
reasoning as unnecessary.46 This triggered an opposite reaction; namely, the
fabrication of a number of pseudo-hadiths. In fact, from about 5000 in total, only
six collections of hadiths have been considered sound.47
Moreover, the proliferation of legal teaching circles allowed for the
development and consolidation of the so-called “schools of thought” of Islam.
These were formed by eminent jurists who refined legal reasoning in the early
years of Islam. Four major schools of thought (madhabs) in Sunni Islam were
formed under the rule of the Ummayad dynasty, taking their names from their
founders.48 These jurists articulated a remarkably detailed theory of law that was
based on the “marriage[,]” as stipulated by Hallaq, between reason and
revelation.49 Given the absence of centralization in legal doctrine after the first
four Caliphs, the schools and varieties of legal doctrines flourished.50
II. CULTURAL HERITAGE AND THE ARTS UNDER THE SHARIA: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW
A. Does the Sharia Contain Any Provisions on Arts and Cultural Heritage?
The Holy Qur’an does not contain any reference concerning the prohibition

45
BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 8 (noting theological conservatists insisted on “rigid literalism in
interpretation”); Badr, supra note 20, at 190–98; COULSON, supra note 23, at 50–51 (noting the school of Kufa,
Iraq [i.e., a Hanafi school] was geographically more open and morally more receptive to foreign legal
influences); see also ESPOSITO, supra note 26, at 55–56; GLENN, supra note 29, at 180–81; Ilias Bantekas, Land
Rights in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman State Succession Treaties, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 652–53 (2015).
46
ESPOSITO, supra note 26, at 110 (discussing conflicting views between the Akhbaris and the Usulis).
47
HALLAQ, supra note 25, at 16–17. Among these, the most reliable are al-Bukhari’s and Al Muslim’s.
48
By chronological order, these include the following: Imam Abu Hanifa who lived and taught in Kufah,
Iraq; Imam Malik al-Asbahi who lived in Madinah, Saudi Arabia; Imam ash-Shafi from Egypt who formulated
the theory of the usul; and Imam Abu Abdullah Ibn Hanbal ash-Shaybani who taught in Bagdhad. See
BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 45–48; KAMALI, supra note 31, at 13–14; HALLAQ, supra note 25, at 33; COULSON,
supra note 23, at 89–90 (noting that, although these are the same usul as were laid down by Imam al-Shafi, the
composite structure of the classical legal theory is fundamentally different from ash-Shafi’s scheme); ESPOSITO,
supra note 26, at 109.
49
HALLAQ, supra note 25, at 16–17.
50
BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 256.
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of images and the creation of icons or sculptures.51 Furthermore, there is nothing
in the Qur’an specifically relating to cultural heritage. Fatimah Alshehaby
argues that the protection of cultural objects belonging to ancient civilizations
could be deduced from a verse stating: “Travel throughout the land and see how
He originated the creation, then Allah will bring it into being one more time.
Surely Allah is Most Capable of everything.”52 Furthermore, the Sharia
embraces the concept of beauty. In fact, the term beauty is encountered manifold
in the Qur’an53 and penetrates the entire logic of arts and culture in the ArabMuslim world.54 For example, according to a well-known hadith narrated by
Muhammad al-Bukhari, when the Angel Gabriel came to Prophet Muhammad,
He is alleged to have said that “God is Beautiful, and He loves beauty[,]”55 and
according to another He is also alleged to have said that “God has inscribed
beauty upon all things.”56 Islamic art, too, is astonishingly beautiful, as any
visitor of the Taj Mahal will testify. Generally hinged upon the quasi-sacred role
of the Word (kalam), it conveys the message of God and is deeply entrenched in
spirituality. This might explain why Islam is generally viewed as a “culture of
the Word” (or a culture of calligraphy), rather than a “culture of the ‘image[.]’”57
This said, the concept of beauty in the sense of the Sharia has significant
pitfalls. Firstly, it remains a metaphysical concept bound to the notion of “Truth”

51
Fatimah Alshehaby, Cultural Heritage Protection in Islamic Tradition, 27 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP.
291, 297 (2020) (“[T]here is no reference to the concept of cultural heritage in Islamic law, but there are several
verses that indicate principles that confer protections, such as human dignity and respect for diversity,
knowledge, and development.”); al-Alwani, supra note 27, at 6 (noting that “[w]hen we read the Holy Qur’an—
the only constitutive source of legislation in Islam—we will not find within it a single text that directly addresses
the question of whether making or possessing ‘pictures’ and ‘images’ is prohibited”); Modj-ta-ba Sadria, Figural
Representation in Islamic Art, 20 MIDDLE E. STUD. 99, 101 (1984) (noting, however, that the emphasis on
ornamental representations of Islamic art denotes a lack of division between the sacred and the profane); K.A.C.
Creswell, The Lawfulness of Painting in Early Islam, 11/12 ARS ISLAMICA 159, 159–166 (1946).
52
QUR’AN 29:20; see Alshehaby, supra note 51, at 298.
53
Alshehaby, supra note 51, at 295–96, 296 n.24; Oludamini Ogunnaike, The Silent Theology of Islamic
Art, RENOVATIO (Dec. 5, 2017), https://renovatio.zaytuna.edu/article/the-silent-theology-of-islamic-art.
54
Alshehaby, supra note 51, at 296 (referring to Jami’ at-Tirmidhi); see also Ogunnaike, supra note 53
(“Is the reward for iĥsān anything other than iĥsān?”) (referring to QUR’AN 55:60); cf. Muhammad al-Ghazali,
Reflections on Islamic View of Art and Literature, 35 ISLAMIC STUD. 425, 428 (1996) (finding that manifestations
of art and literature in Islam “affirm the Infinite Beauty and Absolute Truth and point to the eternal source of all
beauty and truth”).
55
al-Ghazali, supra note 54, at 429–30; Ogunnaike, supra note 53, at 2.
56
Ogunnaike, supra note 53.
57
al-Alwani, supra note 27, ¶¶ 1–3 (“The Arabs, who became the first carriers of the message of Islam,
valued the Word more than images and statues.”); id. ¶ 4 (“The Word—in the view of Arabs and Muslims—is
the medium most capable of expressing the culture’s inner characteristics; for its meanings are agreed upon by
linguists.”).
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of Islam,58 containing several limitations. For example, Muhammad al-Ghazali
finds that “literary or artistic expressions focus their appeal on the baser instincts
and lower passions of man and lead, of necessity, to the distortion of healthy
human nature and to the decadence of culture[,]” all of which are rejected in
Islam “[w]ithout any reservation[.]”59 Secondly, cultural property or arts that
incite idolatry or that constitute expressions of infidelity are not necessarily
beautiful, let alone require preservation under principles of Islamic law. Thirdly,
various hadiths relating to the permissibility of images and visual representation
(i.e., consequently also visual arts) generally add to the complexity of the matter.
Some of these hadiths aim to emphasize that arts and entertainment might
distract from Muslim duties of prayer,60 while others may be linked to the
hostility toward anything that could be seen as imitating God.61 It is narrated, for
example, that when Prophet Muhammad was ill his wives came to see him and
told him about paintings they had seen in a church in Abyssinia (present-day
Ethiopia). Rather than sharing their enthusiasm, the Prophet admonished them
in the following words: “If any religious man dies amongst those people they
would build a place of worship at his grave and make these pictures in it. They
will be the worst creature in the sight of Allah on the Day of Resurrection.”62
Additionally, according to another, Prophet Muhammad allegedly cursed the
image makers in their attempts to imitate God’s act of creation, and he said, “On
the Day of Judgement the punishment of hell will be meted out to the painter,
and he will be called upon to breathe life into the forms that he has fashioned;
but he cannot breathe life into anything.”63 It is noteworthy that most of these
hadiths are considered generally as non-authentic.64 Similar hadiths concerning
58
al-Ghazali, supra note 54, at 431 (“[T]here is the eternal beauty that is real and there is a transient
beauty which is merely contingent.”).
59
Id. at 432.
60
al-Alwani, supra note 27, at 21.
61
Creswell, supra note 51, at 165 (“[A]s a predisposing psychological basis for the hostility to painting,
there was the feeling . . . that the maker of an image or a painting in some way transfers part of the personality
of the subject to the image or painting, and in so doing acquires magical powers over the person reproduced.”).
62
Book 8, No. 419, in 1 SAHIH AL BUKHARI (narrated by Aysha); Book 23, No. 425, in 2 SAHIH AL
BUKHARI (narrated by Aysha); see also JAMAL J. ELIAS, AISHA’S CUSHION: RELIGIOUS ART, PERCEPTION, AND
PRACTICE IN ISLAM (2012).
63
THOMAS W. ARNOLD, PAINTING IN ISLAM: A STUDY OF THE PLACE OF PICTORIAL ART IN MUSLIM
CULTURE 5 (1965); see Book 48, Chapter 113, No. 5363, in 6 SUNAN AN-NASA’L (narrated by Ibn ‘Umar) (“The
makers of these images will be punished on the Day of Resurrection, and it will be said to them: ‘Breathe life
into that which you have created.’”); see also Creswell, supra note 51, at 162 (referring to Vol. 2, Book 41 and
Vol. 4, Book 106 of Sahih Al Bukhari); cf. Department of Islamic Art, Figural Representation in Islamic Art,
METRO. MUSEUM ART (Oct. 2001), https://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/figs/hd_figs.htm (noting the Qur’an
“uses the Arabic term musawwir (“maker of forms,” or artist) as an epithet for God”).
64
Muhammad Al-Atawneh, Leisure and Entertainment (Malāhī) in Contemporary Islamic Legal
Thought: Music and the Audio Visual Media, 19 ISLAMIC L. & SOC’Y 397, 401–02 (2012); Alshehaby, supra
note 51, at 302.
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the prohibition of music are also reported, but equally suffer from weak
transmission.65 As a result of these ambiguities, more elements and concepts are
needed for an understanding of the conditions under which the intentional
destruction of infidels’ cultural heritage is justified.
B. Does the Sharia Contain Any Provisions on the Destruction of Infidel
Cultural Heritage?
The first element underlying the discussion on non-Muslim heritage is the
general presumption of a certain dichotomy under the Sharia between what is
known as the abode of Islam (dar al-Islam) and the abode of unbelief (dar alkufr).66 This distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims also entails a second
discussion on the validity and limitations of jihad under Islamic law. Jihad
(which means to “exert,” “strive,” “struggle”) is sometimes referred to as the
sixth pillar of Islam and is generally divided into violent and non-violent
categories.67 Yet the very concept of jihad is one of the aspects of Islamic law
that has given rise to tensions and abuse more than any other, both within the
Arab-Muslim world and the West. Jihad is commonly understood as
concomitant with the concept of warfare and the establishment of Muslim rule
against non-Muslims.68 As such, it underpins virtually all discussions on the rise
of militant Islam and the treatment of non-Muslim minorities in Muslim lands.69
According to a popular misconception, the dar-al-Islam is the only proper way
to live under the guidance of the Sharia, while the lands of disbelief must be
ultimately conquered through jihad.70 A detailed examination of jihad falls
outside the scope of this study. For the purposes of this Article, the division itself
might have been true in the early years of Islam, albeit even then it was widely

65

Al-Atawneh, supra note 64, at 407.
See, e.g., M.M. Slaughter, The Salman Rushdie Affair: Apostasy, Honor, and Freedom of Speech, 79
VA. L. REV. 153, 174 (1993) (“In modern times, and despite the fact that they are sovereign states, Islamic
nations share a common identity united through submission to Muslim practice and law. This expresses itself in
the legal notion of the dar-al-Islam (house of Islam) and constitutes itself by the contrast with the disbelievers,
the dar-al-harb (house of war, land outside Islam) . . . .”) (alteration in original).
67
See Khaled Abou El Fadl, Islamic Law, Jihad and Violence, 16 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 1
(2017).
68
See generally John L. Esposito, What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam (2002) [hereinafter What
Everyone Needs to Know About Islam]; John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam 26 (2002)
[hereinafter Unholy War]; Khaled Abou El Fadl, Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim
Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries, 1 Islamic L. & Soc’y 141 (1994).
69
See generally WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW ABOUT ISLAM, supra note 68; UNHOLY WAR, supra
note 68; Abou El Fadl, supra note 68, at 141.
70
See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE MODERN ISLAMIC WORLD (1995); THE
OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM AND POLITICS 370–71 (Emad El-Din Shahin ed., 2014); The Concept of Jihad,
supra note 24, at 431.
66
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debated and significantly nuanced.71 As pointed out by various authors already,
“jihad does not include offensive warfare but only permits self-defense . . . the
faith is not intended to be spread by force[,]”72 and jihad is “justified only when
nonMuslims threaten Muslims or interfere with their religious practice.”73
Consequently, the destruction of cultural and religious heritage can never be
justified under jihad. In fact, Islamic law affords substantial protection to
religious art, monuments, and sites, including during armed conflict. Such
protection stems directly from the Qur’an, as various scholars have explained
elsewhere.74 In addition, Prophet Muhammad appears to have been tolerant with
religious and cultural treasures. It is narrated in this respect that when he
conquered Mecca, he smashed idols and icons in the Kaaba yet spared an icon
of the Holy Virgin enlacing Jesus (it is said that the Prophet “[held] his hands
over it for protection while the others were effaced”).75
Likewise, the concept of safeguarding cultural heritage was present among
Prophet Muhammad’s companions and the first Caliphs, even at the time of the
expansion of Islam through jihad. For example, prior to the bombing of the
Buddhas, a delegation from the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
(the main inter-governmental organization of Muslim-majority states based in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia) travelled to Afghanistan.76 The OIC, along with religious

71
Abou El Fadl, supra note 68, at 146 (noting some Muslim jurists have gone as far as arguing that
Muslims may not reside in non-Muslim lands under any circumstances); The Concept of Jihad, supra note 24,
at 431 (noting that jihad has been a specific military doctrine, developed under the reign of the Abbasids and the
Ummayads, related specifically to fighting and warfare, and yet “a permanent state of war between Muslim and
non-Muslim communities did not necessarily call for the military form of jihad”); see also Noor Mohammad,
The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction, 3 J.L. & RELIGION 381, 392 (1985) (citing KHADDURI, supra note 44,
at 64–66); Bantekas, supra note 45, at 375 (citing KHADDURI, supra note 44) (noting that today it is widely
accepted that a third category of lands is possible—the territory of peace (dar-al-sulh)); Bennoune, supra note
24, at 614–15 (citing KHADDURI, supra note 44).
72
Bennoune, supra note 24, at 617.
73
Id.
74
E.g., Abdul Hamid Al-Ansari, Islam and the Preservation of the Human Heritage, in DOHA
CONFERENCE OF ‘ULAMÂ ON ISLAM AND CULTURAL HERITAGE 27–28 (Dec. 30–31, 2001) [hereinafter DOHA
PROCEEDINGS]; Sheikh Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, The Cultural Heritage in Islamic Jurisprudence, in DOHA
PROCEEDINGS, supra, 44–45 (citing QUR’AN 22:32) (discussing the protection of religious-ritual sites); cf.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 181.
75
Sadria, supra note 51, at 99; JAMES NOYES, THE POLITICS OF ICONOCLASM: RELIGION, VIOLENCE, AND
THE CULTURE OF IMAGE-BREAKING IN CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 73 (2012) (referring to a picture of Jesus in
Kabbala that was not spared); see also Anis Ahmad, Islam and Cultural Heritage, in DOHA PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 74, at 50; Abd-ur-Razzak Guessoum, Islam and World Heritage, in DOHA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at
60.
76
Al-Ansari, supra note 74, at 30–32; Christian Manhart, The Afghan Cultural Heritage Crisis:
UNESCO’s Response to the Destruction of Statues in Afghanistan, 105 AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 387, 387–88
(2001).
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leaders and representatives from Egypt, Pakistan, and other Muslim countries
attempted to persuade the Taliban not to proceed with this act.77 Following the
bombing, and under the auspices of the Emir of the State of Qatar, the Doha
Conference was organized.78 During the conference, religious authorities
(ulemas) from various Muslim countries came to the conclusion that “the
preservation of the human cultural heritage derives from its appreciation of
innate human values and from respect for peoples’ beliefs.”79 For example, Dr.
Hamid Al-Ansari, Dean of the Faculty of Sharia, Law, and Islamic Studies at the
University of Qatar, detailed the accommodation of the cultural heritage of
different nations and peoples,80 pointing to the fact that “[i]n numerous verses
of the Qur’ân, attention is . . . drawn to the act of meditating on the antiquities
and heritage of those from the past in order to learn lessons . . . since human
history is a chain of interrelated events, regardless of religion, nation or
culture.”81 Likewise, the Imam Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradâwi reiterated the practice of
the companions of Prophet Muhammad in his statement advising the Taliban to
review the decision to destroy the Buddhas, indicating that when Muslims
conquered Afghanistan in the first century after the Hijrah, they “left [the
Buddhas and other] archaeological remains intact.”82
Another relevant discussion is the eventual prohibition of idolatry in the
Sharia. The Sharia generally proscribes polytheism and idolatry (shirk). Shirk
was considered a serious offense and was punished by stoning, at least in the
early years of Islam. This conception of shirk is deduced from the first pillar of
Islam and the shahada (and the belief in Oneness, or the tawhid) as well as from
Quranic verses83 and the hadith tradition (i.e., Prophet Muhammad’s deeds and
sayings).84 This is also why certain Islamic doctrines specifically prohibit the

77

Al-Ansari, supra note 74, at 30–32; Manhart, supra note 76, at 387–88.
Doha Statement of the International Symposium of ‘Ulamâ on Islam and Cultural Heritage Doha,
Qatar, in DOHA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 7–8.
79
Id.
80
Al-Ansari, supra note 74, at 27–29.
81
Id. at 28.
82
Id. at 31 (noting that other religious experts issued similar statements; for example, the Mufti of Egypt
Dr. Nasr Farid Wâsil found the statues were “simply a historical record and had no adverse impact on the Muslim
belief”).
83
E.g., QUR’AN 2:51–54 (reiterating the Abrahamic myth of the Golden Calf and prohibiting the
worshipping of all except Allah); QUR’AN 5:90 (prohibiting sacrifice on stone alters). See generally NOYES,
supra note 75, at 3–4 (according to whom “the greatest threat to tawhid is shirk”); RICHARD ETTINGHAUSEN &
OLEG GRABAR, THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF ISLAM: 650–1250 21 (1st ed. 1987) (noting the term used is al
ansab, which may also be translated as “statutes” but refers to idols made in human form).
84
Al-Atawneh, supra note 64, at 407 (discussing visual media as shirk); al-Alwani, supra note 27, at 4;
Sheikh Bashir Ghalounji, Islam and the Preservation of Human Heritage, in DOHA PROCEEDINGS, supra note
74, at 58; Al-Ansari, supra note 74, at 32.
78
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visitation of tombs (ziyara).85 Mohamed Badar and Noelle Higgins, for example,
note that “the Wahhabis have consistently denounced the veneration of saints
due to its overtones of polytheism, going so far as to destroy these shrines in the
19th century.”86 According to them, the prohibition “stems partly from the lack
of Quranic sources and partly from ambiguous Prophetic Traditions (hadiths)
which intermittently condemn and advocate ziayarat al-qubur (visitation of
graves).”87
At the same time, however, the appreciation of art in general (i.e., outside
the context of idolatry, paganism, and jihad) is present in the Qur’an. The most
relevant narration is the Quranic version of the parable of the Biblical figure of
King Solomon.88 In these chapters, Solomon is presented as being granted
armies of jinn, humans, and birds to make for him a crystal palace.89 The jinns
made him statues, along with sanctuaries, cooking pots, and other things,90 and
the Queen of Sheba later visited the palace.91 The making of sculptures and
religious devotion appear to co-exist harmoniously in this passage. As Mustansir
85
Mohamed Elewa Badar & Noelle Higgins, Discussion Interrupted: The Destruction and Protection of
Cultural Property Under International Law and Islamic Law - The Case of Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, 17 INT’L
CRIM. L. REV. 486, 500–02 (2017). According to Badar and Higgins, the Wahhabis have accepted the legitimacy
of destroying tombs, even including the tombs of the son of Ali (Ali was the son of the Prophet and fourth
Caliph) and Husayn ibn Ali (whose tomb was destroyed in the late-nineteenth century). Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
QUR’AN 27:1–93; QUR’AN 34:1–54.
89
QUR’AN 27:17–19 (“Solomon’s forces of jinn, humans, and birds were rallied for him, perfectly
organized. And when they came across a valley of ants, an ant warned, ‘O ants! Go quickly into your homes so
Solomon and his armies do not crush you, unknowingly.’ So Solomon smiled in amusement at her words, and
prayed, ‘My Lord! Inspire me to always be thankful for Your favours which You have blessed me and my parents
with, and to do good deeds that please you. Admit me, by Your mercy, into the company of Your righteous
servants.”) (alteration in original); QUR’AN 34:12 (“And to Solomon We subjected the wind: its morning stride
was a month’s journey and so was its evening stride. And We caused a stream of molten copper to flow for him,
and We subjected some of the jinn to work under him by his Lord’s Will. And whoever of them deviated from
Our command, We made them taste the torment of the blaze.”) (alteration in original); see also al-Alwani, supra
note 27, at 6 (presenting Solomon as possessing mystic powers over the jinns and “thankful to the Almighty for
this power”); Al-Ansari, supra note 74, at 32 (“[T]he Qur’ân refers to the graces that God bestowed on His
Prophet Solomon, for whom statues of glass, copper and marble depicting living beings were made. In this
context, no longer associated with worship, statues are considered to be God-given graces for which He should
receive thanks.”).
90
QUR’AN 34:13 (“They made for him whatever he desired of sanctuaries, statues, basins as large as
reservoirs, and cooking pots fixed into the ground. We ordered: ‘Work gratefully, O family of David!’ Only a
few of My servants are truly grateful.”) (alteration in original).
91
QUR’AN 27:44 (“Then she was told, ‘Enter the palace.’ But when she saw the hall, she thought it was
a body of water, so she bared her legs. Solomon said. ‘It is just a palace paved with crystal.’ At last she declared,
‘My Lord! I have certainly wronged my soul. Now I fully submit myself along with Solomon to Allah, the Lord
of all worlds.’”) (alteration in original); see Mustansir Mir, The Queen of Sheba’s Conversion in Q. 27:44: A
Problem Examined, 9 J. QUR’ANIC STUD. 43, 43–56 (2007) (discussing the Quranic and Biblical accounts of the
story of Solomon and the Queen of Sheba).
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Mir explains, the deep devotion of Solomon to God did not prevent him from
being interested in the arts, nor from enjoying the marvelous palace the jinns
built for him.92
This particular story of the Qur’an has been a starting point for the
development of Islamic mystic philosophy. Both the Brethren of Purity (an early
Muslim fraternity of philosophers active in Iraq in the ninth to tenth centuries)
and the Sufis (under the lead of Ibn al Safi) elevated the role of poetic
imagination in the Islamic legal tradition. For example, in the Brethren’s Rasāʾil
(Epistles), which is inspired by the Qur’an, Solomon is represented as both a
King and a Prophet; having medical knowledge, magical powers,93 and
extraordinary capacities, such as formulating magical circles to capture the jinns
that ran away from him;94 speaking the language of birds;95 and overseeing the
competition between human beings and jinns in bringing back the throne of
Queen Sheba.96
C. Early Muslim State Practice on Arts and the Preservation of Heritage
In the same way that sources of Islamic law can be seen as equivalent to
those of public international law,97 the practice of the early Caliphs on matters
related to the preservation of heritage and the arts may be viewed as evidence of
state practice. Historical evidence of Islam’s position on iconoclasm, for
example, shows that the edict issued by the Byzantine emperor Leo on the
destruction of images (726 CE) was not influenced by similar practice of the
leaders of the Muslim world.98 According to K.A.C. Creswell, “the prohibition
against painting did not exist in early Islam, but . . . grew up gradually, partly as
a result of the inherent temperamental dislike of Semitic races for

92

Mir, supra note 87, at 49.
See Jules Janssens, The Ikhwān aṣ-Safāʾ on King-Prophet Solomon, in THE FIGURE OF SOLOMON IN
JEWISH, CHRISTIAN AND ISLAMIC TRADITION 241–53 (Joseph Verheyden ed., 2012) (discussing the
representation of King Solomon by Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ [translated as “the Brethren of Purity”]); see also Suzanne
Pinckney Stetkevych, Solomon and Mythic Kingship in the Arab-Islamic Tradition: Qaṣīdah, Qurʾān and Qiṣaṣ
al-Anbiyā’, 48 J. ARABIC LIT. 1, 1–37 (2017); al-Alwani, supra note 27, at 6, ¶¶ 7–8.
94
Janssens, supra note 89, at 248–49.
95
Id. at 250.
96
Id. at 226–27.
97
Bennoune, supra note 24, at 25.
98
Creswell, supra note 51, at 161–64 (first referring to treaties written by John, Patriarch of Damascus,
in which Muslims are excluded from those who are considered iconoclasts; then referring to treaties written by
Theodore Abū Ḳurra, bishop of Harran, in which Muslims are included “among the people opposed to painting”;
then quoting Michael the Syrian; and then referring to another treaty by Tarasius who “remarked that the accusers
of the Christians had in their destruction of images [sic] imitated the Jews, Pagans, Samaritans, Manichaeans,
and Phantasiasti [or Theopaschites]”).
93
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representational art, partly because of the influence of important Jewish
converts, and partly because of the fear of magic.”99
In fact, almost all arts appear to have been embraced by the Great Caliphs of
the Umayyad (661–760 CE) and the Abbasid dynasties (749–1248 CE), the
Safavids in Persia (fifteenth century), and the Mughals in India (sixteenth
century). This is primarily evidenced by the marvelous iconography found in the
Umayyad Caliphs’ palaces; in particular, the murals of the Ummayad’s palaces
in Qusayr Amrah in Jordan,100 those in Qasr al-Hayr al-Ghari in Syria,101 and
those found in the Abassid palatine complex of Samarra in Iraq.102 Modj-ta-ba
Sadria writes: “[T]he monarchs were known to have their palaces painted with
representational art. They commissioned miniatures for their manuscripts and
even portraits which they kept hidden from critical eyes in separate rooms or in
their closely guarded haram.”103
Among the most impressive of such works belonging to the early years of
Islamic art are arguably the variations of the so-called Shāh-namā (the Book of
Kings) and the Fāl-namā (the Book of Omens), which includes episodes from
Qisas al-Anbiya (Tales of the Prophets) in which initial texts date from 732
AD.104 There were also a few illustrated manuscripts narrating poems, romantic
tales, and love stories, such as the tale of Bayad wa Riyad produced in Medieval
Andalusia.105 Extraordinary collections of these manuscripts are presently

99

Id. at 166.
Quseir Amra, UNESCO, https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/327 (last visited Sept. 6, 2021); see also
ULRIKE AL-KHAMIS & STEFAN WEBER, EARLY CAPITALS OF ISLAMIC CULTURE: THE ART AND CULTURE OF
UMAYYAD DAMASCUS AND ABBASID BAGHDAD (650 - 950) 37–38 (2014).
101
Un Château du Désert : Qasr al-Hayr ach-Charqi, UNESCO, https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/
1298 (last visited Sept. 6, 2021).
102
Eva R. Hoffman, Between East and West: The Wall Paintings of Samarra and the Construction of
Abbasid Princely Culture, 25 MUQARNAS 107, 107–32 (2008); ETTINGHAUSEN & GRABAR, supra note 83, at
124–25; AL-KHAMIS & WEBER, supra note 101, at 62–65.
103
Sadria, supra note 51, at 101 (citing ARNOLD, supra note 63, at 47).
104
Qisas al-Anbiya, BRIT. LIBR., https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/qisas-al-anbiya (last visited Sept. 4,
2021); see also Eva R. Hoffman, The Beginnings of the Illustrated Arabic Book: An Intersection Between Art
and Scholarship, 17 MUQARNAS 37, 37–52 (2000). See generally RACHEL MILSTEIN ET AL., STORIES OF THE
PROPHETS: ILLUSTRATED MANUSCRIPTS OF QISẠS ̣AL-ANBIYĀ’ 27–28 (1999); Ernst J. Grube, Iconography in
Islamic Art, in IMAGE AND MEANING IN ISLAMIC ART 13–33 (Robert Hillenbrand ed., 2005); THE ARTS OF ISLAM:
TREASURES FROM THE NASSER D. KHALILI COLLECTION 262–79 (2011) [hereinafter THE ARTS OF ISLAM].
105
See CYNTHIA ROBINSON, MEDIEVAL ANDALUSIAN COURTLY CULTURE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN:
HADĪTH BAYĀḌ WA RIYĀḌ 1 (James E. Montgomery et al. eds., 2007) (reviewing the tale of Baya wa Riyad’s
significance in Medieval Andalusian history); see also HABIB HASSAN TOUMA, THE MUSIC OF THE ARABS 11
(Laurie Schwartz trans., 2003); cf. Eleni Polymenopoulou, A Thousand Ways to Kiss the Earth: Artistic
Freedom, Cultural Heritage and Islamic Extremism, 17 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 39, 60–62 (2015) (referring
in particular to Representations of the Divine in Arabic Poetry).
100
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exhibited in collections around the world.106 Prophet Muhammad also appears
in many of these manuscripts, and like other prophets that appear in Islamic
iconography, he is usually surrounded by a circular flame halo.107 However,
contrary to other prophets whose faces are visible in depictions, and arguably
because of the “invisibility of [P]rophetic beauty[,]”108 Prophet Muhammad’s
face is likely to be blurred or covered by a veil.109 In some cases, his entire head
or his body is covered by a golden aureole,110 while in other manuscripts dating
from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries he is represented by a flame.111
It was the Caliphs, therefore, who strove to preserve existing cultural
treasures,112 and it is largely thanks to the Caliphs that the arts of the Book,
especially calligraphy, illumination, and miniature, have flourished throughout

106
Cf. Jytte Klausen, The Danish Cartoons and Modern Iconoclasm in the Cosmopolitan Muslim
Diaspora, 8 HARV. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC REV. 86, 97 (2009).
107
See Christiane Gruber, Between Logos (Kalima) and Light (Nūr): Representations of the Prophet
Muhammad in Islamic Painting, 26 MUQARNAS 229, 229–62 (2009); Oleg Grabar & Mika Natif, Histoire des
Portraits du Prophète Muḥammad, in DE LA FIGURATION HUMAINE AU PORTRAIT DANS L’ART ISLAMIQUE 89–
110 (Houari Touati ed., 2015). See generally TARIF KHALIDI, IMAGES OF MUHAMMAD: NARRATIVES OF THE
PROPHET IN ISLAM ACROSS THE CENTURIES (2009); Grube, supra note 105, at 16 n.15; ETTINGHAUSEN &
GRABAR, supra note 83, at 119–25.
108
Priscilla Soucek, The Theory and Practice of Portraiture in the Persian Tradition, 17 MUQARNAS 97,
106 (2000) (noting that during the Mughal dynasty, an “oral tradition” of pictorial representation called the hilya
developed, permitting a person to “imagine the Prophet in his ‘mind’s eye’”); see also Oleg Grabar, The Story
of Portraits of the Prophet Muhammad, 107 STUDIA ISLAMICA 19, 33–34 (2003).
109
See Gruber, supra note 108, at 230 (noting that “[l]uminous paintings adopt the metaphorical language
of the golden aureole to convey the Prophet’s sacred, primordial, and creative light, called the ‘light of
Muhammad’” and “herald the Prophet as a cosmic entity freed from temporal boundaries and corporeal
limitations[]”); id. at 230 fig.1 (illustrating the Prophet Muhammad's ascension in an anthology of Persian
poetry); S. BRENT PLATE, BLASPHEMY: ART THAT OFFENDS 94–95 (2006) (featuring an illustration of Prophet
Muhammad before the Kaaba in Mecca from the Siyer-i Nebi [a fourteenth-century Ottoman epic poem narrating
the life of Prophet Muhammad] as well as an illustration of the Prophet’s ascension from Nizami Ganjavi’s
Khamsa); see also MILSTEIN ET AL., supra note 105, at XXXII [Ms. K.] (illustrating a prophet [most probably
Muhammad] in a mosque); THE ARTS OF ISLAM, supra note 105, at 274 (discussing the Siyer-i Nebi); id. at 275
fig.320 (showing the Prophet Muhammad visiting the Kaaba); id. at 277 fig.322 (showing the Prophet’s
miraculous journey from Mecca to the Al-Aqsa Mosque); Sevgi Kutluay, Siyer-i Nebi (‘Biography of the
Prophet’), MUSEUM WITH NO FRONTIERS: DISCOVER ISLAMIC ART, https://islamicart.museumwnf.org/
database_item.php?id=object;ISL;tr;Mus01;30;en&cp (last visited Nov. 4, 2021).
110
See MILSTEIN ET AL., supra note 105, at XXXII [Ms. T-4.] (illustrating Muhammad’s return from the
Miraj); id. at XXXIII [Ms. T-5.] (illustrating soldiers presenting to Muhammad the severed head of Abu Jahl);
id. at IX [Ms. B.] (illustrating Muhammad on the Miraj); id. at XLII (illustrating a monk recognizing
Muhammad’s prophetic nature); id. at XII [Ms. C.] (illustrating Muhammad praying in the Masjid al-Aqsa); see
also B.W. ROBINSON ET AL., ISLAMIC PAINTING AND THE ARTS OF THE BOOK 168, 216 (1976).
111
See, e.g., File: Muhammad Destroying Idols - L’Histoire Merveilleuse en Vers de Mahomet BNF.jpg,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Muhammad_destroying_idols_-_L%27Histoire_Merveilleuse_en_
Vers_de_Mahomet_BNF.jpg.
112
al-Alwani, supra note 27, at 5–6.
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the centuries.113 Furthermore, the Caliphs engaged in extensive discussions on
the protection of peoples of different faith, buildings of worship, and artifacts of
different religions.114 Likewise, in the sphere of music al-Ghazali asserts that
there are no authentic traditions specifically banning music but rather that
“music was practiced during the lifetime of the Prophet.”115 To claim that
cultural treasures are not protected under the Sharia, therefore, is contrary to
Islamic practice throughout the centuries. As Dr. Abd-ur-Razzak Guessoum
notes at the Doha Conference of the Ulamas, “if statues were prohibited by
Islam, the scholars of al-Azhar would not have allowed Abu Simbel in southern
Egypt’s Nubia, the treasure of Tutankhamun or the solar barques to be
saved[.]”116
D. To Refer or Not to Refer to the Sharia?
1. Hesitation to Refer to the Sharia
International bodies are generally hesitant to refer to Islamic law, its sources,
and applicable fiqh, and they are equally hesitant to clarify the extent to which
they are willing and able to consider Islamic law, even in cases involving
disputes between Muslim states or involving Muslim individuals.117 The best
example of such lost opportunity is arguably the Al Mahdi case.118 Al Mahdi was
tried by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and charged under Article Eight,
Section 2(e)(iv) of the ICC statute to nine years of imprisonment for planning
and overseeing the attacks against mausolea and mosques in Timbuktu, Mali.
113
See generally SHEILA S. BLAIR & JONATHAN M. BLOOM, THE ART AND ARCHITECTURE OF ISLAM:
1250–1800 165–182 (1994); ANTHONY WELCH & STUART CARY WELCH, ARTS OF THE ISLAMIC BOOK: THE
COLLECTION OF PRINCE SADRUDDIN AGA KHAN 19 (1982); Stephen Vernoit, The Visual Arts in NineteenthCentury Muslim Thought, in ISLAMIC ART IN THE 19TH CENTURY: TRADITION, INNOVATION, AND ECLECTICISM
19 (Doris Behrens-Abouseif & Stephen Vernoit eds., 2006); JOHN L. ESPOSITO, THE ISLAMIC WORLD: ABBASID
CALIPHATE-HISTORIANS 48, 50, 52 (2004); ABDULWAHAB MEDDEB, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF
CIVILIZATION 139 (2013); SHEILA R. CANBY, ISLAMIC ART IN DETAIL 32 (2006); THE GROVE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF ISLAMIC ART AND ARCHITECTURE 182–83 (Jonathan M. Bloom & Sheila S. Blair eds., 2009).
114
al-Alwani, supra note 27, at 6–7 (citing SUBHI AL-SALEH 666–69 (Ahkam Ahl al-Thimmah ed., 1961))
(referring to a passage by Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah).
115
Al-Atawneh, supra note 64, at 402; see also Lois Ibsen al Faruqi, Music, Musicians and Muslim Law,
17 ASIAN MUSIC 3, 3, 9 (1985) (noting a general “apprehension of the effects that music could have on Muslim
society in general, on its individual members and even on the performance of Islamic religious duties”) (referring
to Ibn Taymiyyah (1966)).
116
Guessoum, supra note 75, at 60, 62.
117
See supra text accompanying note 44.
118
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC-01/12-01/15, Confirmation of Charges (Mar. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Al
Mahdi Charges], https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_02424.PDF; Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC01/12-01/15, Judgment (Sept. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Al Mahdi Judgment], https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.PDF.

POLYMENOPOULOU_8.17.22

2022]

8/21/2022 2:18 PM

CALIPHS, JINNS, AND SUFI SHRINES

763

This case has already attracted a lot of commentary as it was the first time that
an indictment for war crimes was solely based on attacks against cultural
heritage.119 The fact that the crimes were committed under religious motives was
never disputed.120 Al Mahdi was himself a jihadi, recognized as “the most
competent and prominent person in Timbuktu when it came to being
knowledgeable in religious matters[,]” according to the prosecutor’s charges.121
He was a member of the local Tuareg jihadi organization, Ansar Dine (an
organization collaborating with the local Al-Qaeda branch), and appointed head
of the local morality brigade (Hisbah).122 The attacks he oversaw against
religious sites in Timbuktu were justified under the banner of the Sharia. As the
documents of the ICC proceedings reveal, Al Mahdi conducted research on the
permissibility of mausolea under Islamic law and even “wrote the sermon on
the[ir] destruction . . . which was read at the Friday prayer, on the eve of the
launch of the attack.”123 He provided a response to journalists explaining the
necessity of the attacks by reference to religious ignorance and the prohibition
of idolatry and heresy.124 From a procedural perspective, surely the fact that the
defendant pled to the charges from the outset did not allow for more extensive
elaboration of Islamic law.125 As Badar and Higgins have argued, however, the
119
See Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime Against Property or a Crime
Against People?, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 356–57, 386–88 (2016); Marina Lostal, The
Misplaced Emphasis on the Intangible Dimension of Cultural Heritage in the Al Mahdi Case at the ICC, 1 INTER
GENTES 45, 48 (2017). See generally, Badar & Higgins, supra note 82, at 504; Paige Casaly, Al Mahdi Before
the ICC: Cultural Property and World Heritage in International Criminal Law, 14 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1199,
1212, 1214 (2016); Sebastian A. Green Martinez, Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Northern Mali: A Crime
Against Humanity?, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1073, 1076 (2015).
120
This was recognized by the Chamber of the ICC in the Al Mahdi judgment. Al Mahdi Judgment, supra
note 119, ¶ 31 (noting the Hisbah planned and executed the destruction of the monuments in collaboration with
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM]); id. ¶ 81 (“Lastly, the Chamber notes that the crime was committed
for religious motives.”); cf. Badar & Higgins, supra note 82, at 504–05.
121
See Al Mahdi Charges, supra note 119, ¶ 45; Al Mahdi Judgment, supra note 119, ¶ 9 (“Mr Al Mahdi
has a thorough knowledge of the Koran and gave lectures as an expert on religious matters.”); id. ¶ 31 (noting
Ansar Dine established “a local government, which included an Islamic tribunal, an Islamic police force, a media
commission and a morality brigade[,]” and that the Hisbah planned and executed the destruction of the
monuments in collaboration with the AQIM).
122
See Al Mahdi Charges, supra note 119, ¶¶ 3, 5; Al Mahdi Judgment, supra note 119, ¶ 31.
123
See Al Mahdi Charges, supra note 119, ¶¶ 19–20; Al Mahdi Judgment, supra
note 119, ¶ 37.
124
Al Mahdi Charges, supra note 119, ¶ 20; Al Mahdi Judgment, supra note 119, ¶ 38 (“What you see
here is one of the ways of eradicating superstition, heresy and all things or subterfuge which can lead to
idolatry.”).
125
See Press Release, ICC, Al Mahdi Case: Accused Makes an Admission of Guilt at Trial Opening (Aug.
22, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/test-query1. The defense team, however, is reported to have said the acts
reflected a “clash between two world views” and were “part of a broader struggle over the meaning of Islam[.]”
Badar & Higgins, supra note 82, at 488 (noting the trial was truncated due to the guilty plea). But see
Gerstenblith, supra note 120, at 387 (noting, however, that the ICC prosecutor found “this case [was] not about
determining who was right or wrong from a religious point of view”).
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Chamber could have opted for a more elaborate discussion on the Islamic law
standpoint, while the experts could have shed light on the broader question of
targeting cultural property by Islamic fundamentalists.126
At least three possible reasons can be advanced for this hesitation. The first
may be the complexity of Islamic law. The rich and diverse literature of the
Sharia creates a variety of problems. For one, the lack of uniformity in legal
solutions necessarily leads to disunity in the formulation and application of the
law, which is especially visible in criminal matters.127 Likewise, the “fluidity of
. . . concepts, techniques and structures” in Islamic law may lead to judicial
instability128 as well as legal uncertainty, while the existence of strict hierarchies
in assessing which category encompasses particular conduct (haram,
permissible, neutral, etc.) may also compel jurists to resort to legal tricks to
remain within the ambit of formally permissible legal conduct.129 It is no wonder
that Article 1(1) of the 1980 Rome Convention130 does not generally encompass
“Islamic law” even though it is the highest law of most Muslim-majority legal
systems because of its indeterminate status131 and because in recent years
Islamic finance instruments have been governed by both Islamic and English
law.132 In addition, while the fiqh is flexible enough to embrace novel
approaches to contemporary matters,133 the Islamic legal tradition is embroiled
in fervent debates as to the extent one can revise the fiqh in a manner that allows
scholars to impede the effects of modernization.
Islamic law contains sufficient tools (usul) that are accepted by all schools
and could allow, eventually, modernisation. While all these tools are sanctioned
126

Badar & Higgins, supra note 82, at 512–13, 515.
See Ilias Bantekas, The Disunity of Islamic Criminal Law and the Modern Role of Ijtihād, 9 INT’L CRIM.
L. REV. 651, 651 (2009).
128
GLENN, supra note 29, at 210.
129
Id. at 212–13.
130
The 1980 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome Convention) was
consolidated several times and then transformed into the Rome I Regulation. See Regulation (EC) No 593/2008
of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 17, 2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177/6).
131
Beximco Pharms. Ltd. v. Shamil Bank of Bahrain E.C. [2004] EWCA (Civ) A3/2003/1952 [¶ 29]
(Eng.); Musawi v. R.E. Int’l (UK) Ltd. [2007] EWHC (Ch) 2981.
132
See Sanghi Polyesters Ltd. (India) v. Int’l Inv. KCFC (Kuwait) [2000] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 480 (QB
(Comm)) (Eng.); Inv. Dar Co. KSSC v. Blom Devs. Bank Sal [2009] EWHC (Ch) 3545; Ilias Bantekas,
Transnational Islamic Finance Disputes: Towards a Convergence with English Contract Law and International
Arbitration, 12 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1, 1 (2021).
133
Cf. HALLAQ, supra note 25, at 115–16 (discussing Islamic law in the age of nation-states, arguing that
“the fact of the matter is that even this sphere of law underwent structural and fundamental changes that
ultimately resulted in its being severed from both the substance of classical religious law and the methodology
by which this law had operated”).
127
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under one or more schools and doctrines, they are deeply contradictory—as in
the case of the ability to extract rules by imitating traditions and adherence to
established authority (taqlid),134 and in the case of the opposite ability to engage
in novel individual reasoning (ijtihad) that allows for constructive reform.135
Even in the case of those who agree on at least the permissibility of ijtihad,136
jurists disagree over the qualifications of those who are actually competent to
practice it (i.e., the qualifications of the mujtahid). Principles such as the
preservation of the public interest (istislah/maslaha), for example, confer
substantial discretion to jurists137 and may be used as arguments either in favor
of138 or against the need to safeguard cultural heritage.
A second reason may be the fact that any debates on cultural heritage law
and limits of acceptable artistic creativity under Islamic law are necessarily
concomitant with tensions under international human rights legal standards.
Freedom of speech is the obvious area of tension as it affects creative freedom.
Indicatively, the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, drafted under the
auspices of the OIC in 1993, provides that expression is acceptable insofar as it
remains within the Sharia’s ambit.139 These limitations, in turn, are much
broader than what is acceptable today under international human rights standards
given the persistence of offenses such as blasphemy and apostasy under Islamic
law.140 There are other areas where tensions exist, especially in relation to gender
134

See ESPOSITO, supra note 26, at 261–62.
HALLAQ, supra note 25, at 27 (providing that ijtihad is the process of reasoning in the case of Quranic
and Prophetic statements with “inferences, both linguistic and legal” as a “best guess of what . . . might be the
law pertaining to a particular case[,]” and noting that “Islamic law is . . . overwhelmingly the result of ijtihad”);
see ANVER M. EMON, ISLAMIC NATURAL LAW THEORIES 12 (2010) (defining ijtihad as “renewed interpretation,
on matters already addressed by historical precedent”); see also GLENN, supra note 29, at 213; BASSIOUNI, supra
note 23, at 26–27. See generally TAHA JABIR AL-ALWANI, ISLAMIC THOUGHT: AN APPROACH TO REFORM 11
(2006); ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA‘IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990); TARIQ RAMADAN, RADICAL REFORM 22 (2009).
136
See ESPOSITO, supra note 26, at 258–59; see also F.E. Vogel, The Closing of the Door of Ijtihad and
the Application of the Law, 10 AM. J. ISLAMIC SOC. SCIS. 396 (1993) (discussing the “closing” of the doors to
ijtihad in the twelfth century CE).
137
Cf. Rosen, supra note 42, at 239–40.
138
Cf. Alshehaby, supra note 51, at 300 (referring to Araki); Araki, supra note 73, at 34, 45 (“[T]he items
which [are] obligatory to protect and forbidden to neglect include useful antiquities of major moral or material
benefit that are conventionally held to be in the public interest in view of the overall benefits they bring.”).
139
Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam art. 22, adopted Aug. 5, 1990, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/
instree/cairodeclaration.html (“Everyone shall have the right to express his opinion freely in such manner as
would not be contrary to the principles of the Shari’ah. . . . Everyone shall have the right to advocate what is
right, and propagate what is good, and warn against what is wrong and evil according to the norms of Islamic
Shari’ah.”).
140
See Anver M. Emon, On the Pope, Cartoons, and Apostates: Shari’a 2006, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 303,
303–21 (2007); Intisar A. Rabb, Negotiating Speech in Islamic Law and Politics: Flipped Traditions of
135
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and women’s rights, minorities, non-discrimination, and equality.141 Generally
speaking, women artists, minority artists, and other vulnerable groups suffer
from persistent types of discrimination in the Muslim world precisely because
of questions of incompatibility between the states’ constitutional laws
(providing for equality and non-discrimination) and interpretations of Islamic
law that view women as inferior. For example, male-guardianship laws in
several Gulf countries, although relaxed in some areas, significantly affect
women artists’ right to receive education in the arts or become professional
artists, curators, musicians, or actresses as official approval by their guardian is
still formally needed. It is still difficult today for women to receive fine arts
education,142 open galleries, practice the arts, or send their applications to a film
contest if their guardian disagrees, further affecting women’s ability to perform.
Impeding women and vulnerable groups from taking part in cultural life, even
on cultural or religious grounds, is therefore a breach of standards set forth by
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.143 These laws,
however, are increasingly open to discussion and debate and seen as backwards
even within Muslim societies.
A third issue that adds to the complexity may be conflicting interpretations,
which are not restricted to the spheres of conflicting doctrines and schools of
thought. With respect to Muslim minority rights, problems related to hierarchy
and co-existence between conflicting Islamic rules and state laws unavoidably
will exist in modern Muslim states144 as well as non-Muslim states. Furthermore,
problems of hierarchy and co-existence may also arise when Muslim laws are
applied in parallel with tribal or customary laws. These problems are especially
Expression, in ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 26, at 144–67; Irmgard
Marboe, Freedom of Expression: Theory and Practice in the Islamic Realm, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack et al. eds., 2018); M. Christian Green, Between Blasphemy and Critique:
Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech, 29 J.L. & RELIGION 176, 176–96 (2014). See generally ABDULLAH
SAEED & HASSAN SAEED, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, APOSTASY AND ISLAM 1–3 (2004); Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa‘im, The Contingent Universality of Human Rights: The Case of Freedom of Expression in African and
Islamic Contexts, 11 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 304, 304–05 (1997).
141
See generally Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na‘im, Islamic Law, International Relations, and Human Rights:
Challenge and Response, 20 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 317, 318; MASHOOD A. BADERIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC LAW (2003).
142
See, e.g., Siobhan Hegarty, ‘I Am My Own Guardian’: Feminist Saudi Street Artist Saffaa Protests
Sexist Law, ABC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-10-08/feminist-artist-protests-saudiarabias-male-guardianship-law/9022770.
143
Cf. Sital Kalantry et al., Enhancing Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Using
Indicators: A Focus on the Right to Education in the ICESCR, 32 HUM. RTS. Q. 253, 268 (2010) (discussing
non-discrimination and equal treatment).
144
See Clark B. Lombardi & Nathan J. Brown, Do Constitutions Requiring Adherence to Shari’a Threaten
Human Rights? How Egypt’s Constitutional Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law, 21 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV. 379, 388–89 (2006).
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visible in Western Africa, central Asia, and South Asia,145 where local traditions
maintain their validity. For example, in Al-Mahdi, at the time of the commission
of the crimes, tribal laws were also applicable in Mali.146
Moreover, the application of the Sharia in Muslim states has been set aside
in many cases by the transplant of European laws, whether through
colonialism147 or self-imposed processes.148 For Muslim minorities living in
Europe, in particular, the application of the Sharia is mostly optional, even for
personal matters.149 The pure classical version of the Sharia as formed during
the times of Prophet Muhammad therefore cannot and does not exist in the
context of a modern (Muslim) state.150 Religious laws, in practice, always
interact with state laws to varying degrees. Even official Sharia-compliant states,
as is the case with Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have adopted elaborate civil codes151
and common law principles in commercial matters.152
A fourth reason for which references are held to a minimum may also be the
problem of fundamentalism and the confusion between mainstream and non145

GLENN, supra note 29, at 211.
MARINA LOSTAL, EXPERT REPORT – REPARATIONS PHASE: THE PROSECUTOR V. AHMAD AL FAQI AL
MAHDI: ICC-01/12-01/15 33 (May 3, 2017); see also Lostal, supra note 120, at 50 (noting Timbuktu is
sometimes called the “City of the 333 (Sufi) Saints” and that “[i]t was the so-called ‘idolatrous’ nature of these
mausoleums and mosques that led to the destruction of several of them between May and July 2012”).
147
COULSON, supra note 23, at 149. A concrete example is Section 377 of The Indian Penal Code that
makes “unnatural intercourses” a criminal offense. The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 377.
148
See Ilias Bantekas, The Globalization of English Contract Law: Three Salient Illustrations, 137 L.Q.
REV. 130 (2021) (explaining how many states, including those in the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] and their
special economic zones, have adopted English law).
149
See Molla Sali v. Greece, App. No. 20452/14, ¶ 12 (June 18, 2020), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/
conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=003-6724322-8964240&filename=Grand%20Chamber%20judgment%20
in%20the%20case%20Molla%20Sali%20v.%20Greece%20(just%20satisfaction).pdf (concerning the compulsory
application of Sharia law to inheritance matters in Greece until 2018). See generally Iakovos Iakovidis & Paul
McDonough, The Molla Sali Case: How the European Court of Human Rights Escaped a Legal Labyrinth While
Holding the Thread of Human Rights, OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 427, 427–446 (2019).
150
See generally ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 26, at 52–81;
BADERIN, supra note 142, at 38; BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 81.
151
See ILIAS BANTEKAS & AHMED AL AHMED, THE CONTRACT LAW OF QATAR (forthcoming 2022)
(showing that Qatari contract law is not only predicated on the civil law tradition, but is also moving away from
its Egyptian influences).
152
Emon, supra note 26, at 68 (“Islamic law today is immersed within a complex, bureaucratic state
system, in which Islamic law is a partial source, if even that, for legal systems that are primarily based on
European models of civil law and governance.”); BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 81 (discussing the secularization
of modern Muslim states); Eleni Polymenopoulou, Human Rights in the Six Arab States of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC): From Vision to Reality, 3 INT’L COMPAR., POL’Y & ETHICS L. REV. 929, 953 (2020) (discussing
the “[e]mergence of a [p]arallel [l]egal [system]” in the countries of the GCC and noting that the legal system of
Gulf States as a whole is not governed by the Sharia); Ilias Bantekas, Transplanting the Unidroit Contract
Principles into the Qatar Financial Center: A Fresh Paradigm for Wholesale Legal Transplants?, 26 UNIF. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2021).
146
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mainstream approaches of Islamic law. Hadiths on the prohibition of the arts,
for example, have been used by conservative movements within Islam to
maintain prohibitions of arts and music on purely religious grounds. An example
is the religious edict issued by Mullah Omar (i.e., edict allowing destruction of
the Bamiyan Buddhas).153 In addition to the extreme violence and brutality
inflicted upon religious minorities, such as Shi’as, Christians, and Yazidis,154
ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and other jihadi organizations have not spared the right to
education nor the right to participate in cultural life in a broader sense. It has
been reported, for instance, that in 2014 militants requested schools in Mosul to
stop teaching music and the arts155 and that ISIS also restricted music in
weddings, musical events, and traditional ceremonies in Syria.156 Branches of
ISIS in Africa and South Asia also showed themselves capable of targeting
culture, including the demolition of Sufi shrines in Timbuktu (as in the case of
Ansar Dine)157 and the closing down of the once-renowned Festival du
Desert.158 In Nigeria, cultural lifestyles have been affected because of extreme
instability, insecurity, and displacements in the areas controlled by Boko
Haram.159 In Mogadishu, Somalia, Al-Shabab has banned all radio stations from
playing music and has mandated the cultivation and display of beards by men;160
in Peshawar, Pakistan, music is largely seen as forbidden under the Sharia, and
153
See Manhart, supra note 76, at 387–88 (referring to Mullah Omar’s edict and providing a short excerpt);
see also Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and
International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 624 (2003) (citing Kamal Houssain (Special Rapporteur on the
Situation of Human Rights in Afghanistan), Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms in Any Part of the World, ¶ 48, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2001/43 (Mar. 9, 2001)).
154
Mohamed Elewa Badar, The Road to Genocide: The Propaganda Machine of the Self-Declared Islamic
State (IS), 16 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 361, 361–411 (2016) (noting that ISIS and other jihadis have been spreading
hateful propaganda about the sanctioning of shirk under the Sharia, as well as the practice of takfir—the
excommunication of a person as a disbeliever, or ‘kafir’—under the goal of eliminating other religious groups);
Mohamed Badar et al., The Radical Application of the Islamist Concept of Takfir, 31 ARAB L.Q. 134, 134–62
(2017).
155
Sarah Cascone, ISIS Cuts Art, Music, and History Education in Iraq, ARTNET (Sept. 16, 2014),
https://news.artnet.com/art-world/isis-cuts-art-music-and-history-education-in-iraq-103714.
156
Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Rep. of the Hum. Rts. Council on Its
Twenty-Seventh Session, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/CRP.3 (Nov. 14, 2014); Qureshi, supra note 2, at 70
(asserting that “armed conflict destroys traditional festivals and cultural practices and also leaves negative
impacts on the emotional, psychological, and cultural aspects of society”).
157
See Al Mahdi Charges, supra note 119, ¶ 34.
158
Larry Rohter, Musical Nomads, Escaping Political Upheaval, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/arts/music/musical-nomads-escaping-political-upheaval.html.
159
Cf. Chinwe Julie Abara, The Challenges of Safeguarding and Securing Cultural Heritage Materials
During Violent Conflict in Nigeria, in ACTAS DEL SEGUNDO CONGRESO INTERNACIONAL DE BUENAS PRÁCTICAS
EN PATRIMONIO MUNDIAL 375–84 (2015).
160
FREEMUSE, CHALLENGES AND EFFECTS OF TERROR ON ARTS AND CULTURE: STAKEHOLDER SUBMISSION,
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/RuleOfLaw/NegativeEffectsTerrorism/Freemuse.p
df.
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attacks on Sufi shrines and music occur regularly;161 and even in Karnataka,
India, Suhana Syed, a female singer and winner of a music contest, received
death threats and warnings by local imams for being “anti-Sharia[.]”162
2. The Benefits of Referring to the Sharia
Judges and experts within international institutions who deal with
accountability for cultural-rights violations and the destruction of heritage may
be confronted with a dilemma. Should judges and experts refer to Islamic law in
a case involving Muslim cultural heritage, Sharia-based motivations, or Muslim
applicants? If they do, is it a good idea? This dilemma is even more prominent
since the composition of international bodies is generally multi-cultural in that
it includes international judges who represent all legal traditions, therefore
encompassing the Muslim legal tradition. Moreover, the statutes of international
courts and tribunals render Islamic law directly relevant to transnational
adjudication. By way of illustration, the ICJ is bound to apply not only
international treaties and customary law, but also “the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations.”163 The ICC statute also contains an explicit
provision under which the Court is obliged to take into account all legal
traditions of the world, especially those more pertinent in a particular case.164
In matters specifically concerning Muslim heritage and Muslim populations,
it is evident that references to Islamic law would also be pertinent. For example,
such an eventuality might well arise in the examination of issues related to the
destruction of Syrian and Iraqi heritage,165 and could include an examination of
humanitarian law principles in Islamic jurisprudence.166 Relevant references
161
Id. ¶ 40; see also Rohini Swamy, Radical Islamists Troll, Threaten, Abuse Muslim Woman for Singing
Hindu Devotional Song, INDIA TODAY (Mar. 8, 2017, 3:34 AM), https://www.indiatoday.in/fyi/story/suhanasyed-muslim-woman-abuse-threaten-hindu-devotional-song-964585-2017-03-08.
162
SRIRAK PLIPAT, THE STATE OF ARTISTIC FREEDOM 40 (2018).
163
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(c); see also Eleni Polymenopoulou, Cultural
Rights in the Case-Law of the International Court of Justice, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 447, 447–64 (2014)
(discussing the case of the Bosnian genocide).
164
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 21(1) (“The Court shall apply: (a) In the first
place, this Statute . . . ; (b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules
of international law . . . ; (c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of
legal systems of the world . . . .”); see Mohamed Elewa Badar, Islamic Law (Sharia) and the Jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 411, 411–33 (2011); also EMILIA JUSTYNA POWELL,
ISLAMIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES 114 (2019).
165
See Caitlin V. Hill, Killing a Culture: The Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq and
Syria Under International Law, 45 GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 191, 193–215 (2016); see also Gerstenblith, supra
note at 120, at 372, 385–86.
166
Cf. Bassiouni, supra note 23, at 159, 251–52 (noting violations of IHL have been long recognized under
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could also be pertinent even where the perpetrators are not Muslim, as in the
example of the destruction of Palestinian heritage,167 the Bosnian Genocide
during the war in the former Yugoslavia,168 and even the Khmer Rouge’s
destruction of Cham cultural property in Cambodia.169 In these cases, references
to Islamic law could be useful inter alia in reinforcing the cultural and religious
legitimacy of the claims in a spirit of inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue.
A better understanding of Islamic law, therefore, could further facilitate
better collaboration with Muslim countries and even communication with NSAs
who are acting in the Muslim world and are not bound by humanitarian law—
yet may be keen to act upon Islamic law.170 A better understanding of Islamic
law could also be among the cultural factors to be considered in heritage
management and safeguarding of heritage. In fact, following 9/11, religious and
cultural sensibilities are increasingly taken into account, not only in military
operations,171 but also in archaeological excavations and operations concerning
the preservation or safeguarding of cultural heritage.172 Inversely, targeted

the Sharia); Bennoune, supra note 24, at 606 (arguing “the history of contemporary international humanitarian
law must be revised to include the contributions made by Islamic civilization”); James Cockayne, Islam and
International Humanitarian Law: From a Clash to a Conversation Between Civilizations, 84 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 597 (2002). See generally MAJID KHADDURI, THE ISLAMIC LAW OF NATIONS: SHAYBANI’S SIYAR 4
(1966).
167
See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/10/19, at ¶ 3 (Mar. 26, 2009)
(demanding that the occupying power, Israel, stop the targeting of civilians and the systematic destruction of the
cultural heritage of the Palestinian people).
168
See Theodor Meron, The Protection of the Cultural Property in the Event of an Armed Conflict Within
the Case‐Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 57 MUSEUM INT’L 41, 41–60
(2005); see also Micaela Frulli, Advancing the Protection of Cultural Property Through the Implementation of
Individual Criminal Responsibility: The Case-Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 15 ITALIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 195, 195 (2005).
169
CAROLINE EHLERT, PROSECUTING THE DESTRUCTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: WITH A CASE STUDY ON THE KHMER ROUGE’S DESTRUCTION OF CAMBODIA’S HERITAGE 182
(2014); cf. ISLAM AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND JUSTICE 1–2 (Tallyn Gray ed., 2018).
170
See also Alex P. Schmid, Challenging the Narrative of the “Islamic State”, 6 TERRORISM & COUNTERTERRORISM STUD. (2015) (referring to the persuasive letter prepared by a group of 152 leading Islamic scholars
and addressed to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi “outlining what they consider to be errors and violations of
Islamic and international laws committed by the leaders and followers of ISIS”); cf. Cockayne, supra note 167,
at 614–15 (discussing interventions by Islamic delegates to clarify the concept of ‘combatant’ in discussions
with PLO and Algerian groups); Alessandro Chechi, Non-State Actors and Cultural Heritage: Friends or Foes?,
19 ANUARIO DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD AUTONOMA DE MADRID 457, 468–69 (2015)
(noting the potentially positive role of NSAs in protecting cultural heritage).
171
See Iran: Dialogue on Islam and International Humanitarian Law in Qom, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS
(Jan. 12, 2006), https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/feature/2006/ihl-islam-event-011206.htm.
172
See Salam Al Quntar et al., Responding to a Cultural Heritage Crisis: The Example of the Safeguarding
the Heritage of Syria and Iraq Project, 78 NEAR E. ARCHAEOLOGY 154, 155 (2015) (“[T]he next stage in the
archaeological engagement with cultural heritage . . . has embraced a more community-centered approach over
the past two decades in sympathy with theoretical developments in human rights law . . . .”).
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archaeologists, cultural experts, museum experts, and other “cultural heritage
defenders”173 are seen as victims of cultural rights violations. Ultimately, an
approach that takes into account Islamic law could entail better and more
effective protection of cultural heritage and the arts in the Arab-Muslim world.
IV. LOOKING AT MODERN MUSLIM STATE PRACTICE
In Muslim-majority states, Sharia is a source of law. In Sharia-compliant
countries, in particular, Sharia is recognized in the state constitution as the
primary legal source.174 This means that in certain matters, Sharia may, at least
in theory, set aside other rules (as is the case especially in personal and criminal
laws). Today, Muslim states following Sunni Islam generally adhere to one of
the four major schools of thought (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi, or Hanbali),175 and
Shiites generally adhere to other schools.176 Adherence to an official school is
recognized either expressly or de facto as the official state doctrine.177 In
practice, however, movements within Islam as well as local traditions, usages
(urf), and customs (adat) are also influential—for example, Wahhabism in Saudi
Arabia.178 This means that jurists within a Muslim state are usually instructed to
resolve issues based on one school of thought, and that the courts, primarily in
personal matters, follow in principle the jurisprudence of a specific school.179

173

See Bennoune supra note 15, ¶¶ 68–75.
See QATAR CONST. art. 1 (“Its religion is Islam and Shari’a law shall be a main source of its
legislations.”); see also SUDAN CONST. art. 5(1) (“Sources of Legislation[:] Nationally enacted legislation . . .
shall have as its sources of legislation Islamic Sharia and the consensus of the people.”); Clark B. Lombardi,
Designing Islamic Constitutions: Past Trends and Options for a Democratic Future, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 615,
615–17 (2013) (discussing what he calls “Sharia Guarantee Clauses (SGCs)” in Muslim states’ constitutions and
noting that the principle that “state law should be consistent with sharia” has a long pedigree in Islamic political
thought); Polymenopoulou, supra note 153, at 934–37 (discussing Gulf States’ constitutions).
175
For example, Algeria follows the Maliki school, yet in some regions Ibadi Islam is applied. Emon,
supra note 26, at 59. Also, some Muslim states follow lesser-known schools—for instance, most Omanis adhere
to Ibadi Islam. Id.
176
For example, take the Twelvers, Jafaris, and Zayidis. See COULSON, supra note 23, at 103–19.
177
See generally COULSON, supra note 23, at 86, 88–89, 101 (discussing unity, diversity, and “mutual
tolerance” among the schools and referring to a ninth-century case, known as the House of the Elephant, in
which the outcome of litigation at each stage of the process depended on the affiliation of the qadis to one school
or another); Emon, supra note 26, at 62 (noting the authority of the qadi’s ruling in a case where the husband
and wife belonged to different schools).
178
ESPOSITO, supra note 26, at 119–20, 231; BASSIOUNI, supra note 23, at 46; see also Emon, supra note
26, at 67; Andrew M. Bennett, Islamic History & Al-Qaeda: A Primer to Understanding the Rise of Islamist
Movements in the Modern World, 3 PACE INT’L L. REV. 316, 340–43 (2013); DAVID COMMINS, From Wahhabi
to Salafi, in SAUDI ARABIA IN TRANSITION: INSIGHTS ON SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS
CHANGE 151–66 (Bernard Haykel et al. eds., 2015).
179
The Family Law, No. 22 of 2006, art. 3 (Qatar) (stating as an example that Courts shall apply Hanbali
Islamic law).
174

POLYMENOPOULOU_8.17.22

772

8/21/2022 2:18 PM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

However, in matters related to arts and culture, at least in states that are more
open to Western influences, the Sharia is usually side-lined. This is also
presumably why some Muslim thinkers find that the entire sphere of culture and
the arts in the Muslim world overemphasizes Western values, downplaying
Islamic art and literature.180 The complexity of the Sharia and the challenging
task of accurately interpreting the fiqh (or eventually, arguing on the need to
reform the fiqh) may be among the reasons that cultural policy makers generally
refrain from referring to Sharia law. It may be for this reason that a modern,
contemporary art scene is developing even in those countries specifying Sharia
law as a source of law in their constitution. Qatar is arguably the best example
of this evolution. The Qatar Fund for Development has been continuously
supporting the UNESCO with substantial contributions.181 The UNESCO office,
which serves as the “Cluster Office for Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen[,]” is becoming increasingly more active,
including in the field of promoting cultural diversity and preventing
radicalization,182 and a new law on the safeguarding of cultural heritage is
currently being drafted.183 Saudi Arabia, where the government pours billions
into the art economy,184 has also been emphasizing the growth of its art sector
and cooperation with cultural institutions and bodies around the world. One
cannot but be astonished that conservative ulemas are advocating in favor of
wholesale prohibitions against images and music in cities as modern as Jeddah
and Riyadh, condemning provocative artists on blasphemy and apostasy
charges,185 at the same time that Saudi Arabia is leading other Gulf countries in
180
al-Ghazali, supra note 54, at 426 (noting, for example, that “[o]ften there seems to be a deliberate
attempt on their part to deny or disregard the universal and perennial spirit animating the literary and artistic
masterpieces produced by Muslims” and that “[m]uch is made of the non-Muslim sources or tools which might
have been employed by Muslims in their artistic works”).
181
See, e.g., The Qatar Fund for Development Boosts UNESCO’s Heritage Emergency Fund with US $2
Million Contribution, UNESCO (Mar. 2, 2018), https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1791; Qatar Development
Fund Boosts UNESCO Heritage Emergency Fund, UNESCO (Dec. 12, 2015), https://en.unesco.org/news/qatardevelopment-fund-boosts-unesco-heritage-emergency-fund; Qatar Hikes Contribution to Unesco, GULF TIMES
(Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.gulf-times.com/story/516443/Qatar-hikes-contribution-to-Unesco.
182
Gulf States & Yemen, UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/fieldoffice/doha (last visited Sept. 7, 2021); see
also Preventing Violent Extremism, UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/preventingviolentextremism (last visited
Sept. 7, 2021).
183
QM, UCL Qatar to Develop New Cultural Heritage Law, GULF TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.gulftimes.com/story/608233/QM-UCL-Qatar-to-develop-new-Cultural-Heritage-Law.
184
Danijel Cubelic, The Creative Kingdom: Economic Reform and Art as a New Space of Islamic Critique
in Saudi Arabia, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR RELIGIONSWISSENSCHAFT 27, 29 (2019); see also Maha Abdullah Al
Senan, The Worth of Art: The Future of the Art Market in Saudi Arabia, 4 INT’L DESIGN J. 193 (2018); Suzi
Mirgani, Introduction: Art and Cultural Production in the GCC, 7 J. ARABIAN STUD. 1, 9 (2017).
185
Ben Hubbard, Artist’s Death Sentence Follows a String of Harsh Punishments in Saudi Arabia, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/world/middleeast/saudi-artists-death-sentence-
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boosting its entertainment sector and art market. Promotion of the arts in the
Kingdom includes, for example, the proliferation of cultural and artistic events
and festivals, including the Red Sea Festival; the outstanding growth of the film
industry, including nominations at the Cannes;186 sensational contemporary art
sold at astronomic prices at Christies Dubai;187 an upcoming scene of urbanstyle street art;188 and even modern feminist art,189 including graffiti by female
artists.190 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia alone today has a variety of inscriptions in
both the World Heritage list and the list for intangible cultural heritage, as well
as a number of tentative nominations.191 These nominations include the murals
in Qurayt Al-Faw in Saudi Arabia (the large-dimension wall paintings and
sculptures created in a style that presents important similarities with the
Hellenistic tradition, and mosaics “most likely made by Christian artisans who
had gained their skill working on the many mosaic programs adoring Byzantine
churches in the eastern Mediterranean”).192
It is equally important to look specifically for best practices by regional
organizations in the Arab-Muslim world fostering the arts, culture, and letters.
For example, the ALESCO (the equivalent of UNESCO in the Arab world and
that aims at “[p]roviding propitious conditions for the development of education,
culture, sciences, the environment, and communication in the Arab World”)193
hosted in December 2020 “a coordination meeting that brought together several
directors of Arab film festivals and representatives of film institutions to discuss
follows-a-string-of-harsh-punishments.html (discussing Palestinian artist Ashraf Fayadh). See generally
Cubelic, supra note 185, at 28 (discussing, based on interviews with artists from Saudi Arabia, the application
of these laws on Saudi artists); Laith Ulaby, Music and Mass Media in the Arab Persian Gulf, 40 MIDDLE E.
STUD. ASS’N BULL. 213, 216 (2006) (“Religious and conservative figures have been especially critical of the
American Idol-type shows, such as Superstar and Star Academy that have become extremely popular in the Arab
world the last few years.”).
186
See, e.g., Polymenopoulou, supra note 153, at 977–78 (referring to Wadjda); Deema al-Khudair,
Cinema Investment in Saudi Arabia Set to Hit SR5bn in 2020, ARAB NEWS (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.arabnews.com/
node/1619496/saudi-arabia.
187
Al Senan, supra note 185, at 193.
188
Farah al-Sharif, Streets Come to Life in Saudi Arabia’s First Graffiti Project, ARAB NEWS (Mar. 1,
2018), https://www.arabnews.com/node/1256736/saudi-arabia.
189
Mallika Rao, These Saudi Women Are Turning Feminism into Art, HUFFPOST, https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/saudi-arabian-women-artists_n_7062722 (Dec. 6, 2017).
190
Hala Tashkandi, Artist Interweaves Feminist Ideals with Textiles, ARAB NEWS (Jan. 1, 2019),
https://www.arabnews.com/node/1428771/art-culture; Tareq al-Thaqafi, Writing on the Wall: Saudi Graffiti
Artists Make Their Mark, ARAB NEWS (Feb. 20, 2021), https://www.arabnews.com/node/1812326/saudi-arabia.
191
Director-General Celebrates Inscription of the Madâin Sâlih Site on the World Heritage List During
Official Visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, UNESCO (Mar. 19, 2009), https://whc.unesco.org/en/news/495.
192
ISLAMIC ART AND VISUAL CULTURE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF SOURCES 1–6, 99 (D. Fairchild Ruggles ed.,
2011).
193
In Brief, ARAB LEAGUE EDUC., CULTURAL & SCI. ORG. (Mar. 7, 2019), http://www.alecso.org/nsite/en/
component/content/article/814-who-are-we- v2?catid=63&Itemid=220 (alteration in original).
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strategies for mitigating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the
industry.”194 Similarly, the Islamic World Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (ICESCO) has been calling on the international community “to
increase their coordination efforts” in the field of culture and the arts, with the
aim of “develop[ing] a mutually agreed global artistic system on the role of art
in building human civilization and spreading the values of peace.”195 The
ICESCO has been an immense contributor to the preservation and safeguarding
of heritage through the establishment of chairs in the fields of heritage, the arts,
and literature,196 as well as the International Center for Arts, ICESCO’s Cultural
and Academic Chairs.197 To this, one should add other best practices of Muslim
states, including not only the ratification of the major UNESCO treaties on
cultural heritage and a number of nominations to UNESCO lists by ArabMuslim countries, but also their increasingly active participation in all spheres
of UNESCO’s work.198
CONCLUSION
Islamic law is based on immutable sources (the Qur’an and the Sunna) as
well as an extremely diverse body of legal jurisprudence, known as the fiqh. An
examination of the sources of Islamic law related to cultural heritage therefore
does not stand without an examination of the relevant fiqh. Even so, neither of
these sources provides a clear answer as to the permissibility of arts specifically
under the Sharia. The Qur’an embraces the concept of beauty but does not
provide any guidance on arts and the safeguarding of cultural monuments—save
for religious sites. Prohibitions related to iconoclasm and idolatry could be
relevant, but these have been unanimously rejected by the highest authorities of
Muslim scholars. Furthermore, there is a rich body of hadiths that prohibit arts
and music, yet these appear to be largely fabricated and, in any case, nonauthentic. At the same time, the outstanding diversity of religious doctrines and
schools of Islamic law has allowed for fierce disagreements and the development
of contradictory movements within Islamic legal thinking.

194
Regional Perspectives | Arab States, UNESCO (May 1, 2021), https://en.unesco.org/news/regionalperspectives-arab-states-2.
195
ICESCO Calls for Global Partnership in Islamic Art, ISLAMIC WORLD EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG.
(Nov. 26, 2020), https://www.icesco.org/en/2020/11/26/icesco-calls-for-global-partnership-in-islamic-art.
196
AlMalik: ICESCO Works Toward Reviving Islamic Heritage of Sciences and Arts, ISLAMIC WORLD
EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG. (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.icesco.org/en/2020/12/17/almalik-icesco-workstoward-reviving-islamic-heritage-of-sciences-and-arts.
197
Vision, Mission & Objectives, ISLAMIC WORLD EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., https://www.icesco.
org/en/vision-mission-objectives (last visited Sept. 7, 2021).
198
World Heritage Comm., Rep. on Its Forty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. WHC/21/44.COM/10A (2021).
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International bodies have good reasons to also refer to Islamic law in matters
related to arts, letters, and the safeguarding of cultural heritage. These
references, however, should point not only to the Qur’an or the Sunna alone, but
also to the fiqh and the practice of tolerance and diversity throughout the
centuries of Islamic civilization.199 This approach of using diverse references
has been followed by many religious authorities when arguing about free speech,
culture, and cultural rights. By way of illustration, following the Danish cartoons
controversy, in which cartoons depicting Prophet Muhammad as a terrorist were
published in 2005 by the journal Jyllands-Posten, a group of Muslim scholars
issued a statement on the cartoons.200 These scholars, however, did not seize the
opportunity to refer in detail to Islamic law standards on freedom of speech, but
rather confined themselves to a Quranic verse, which states that Muslims should
“argue with them [polytheists/disbelievers] in the most courteous way[.]”201
State practice equally supports the hypothesis of tolerance and diversity in
artistic expressions. A number of illustrated manuscripts and works of art,
including representations of Prophet Muhammad, demonstrate that music and
the arts have been practiced throughout Islamic history. Moreover, a number of
murals demonstrate deep influences by Hellenistic and Byzantine art. In
addition, the practice of the Caliphs and leaders of the Muslim world shows that
funding for artists, musicians, and performers was available throughout the
centuries. These findings could be useful in fostering collaboration between the
UNESCO and other organizations working in the field of arts and culture,
Muslim organizations, and NSAs based in the Muslim world.
Extremist views of the Sharia and the alleged Sharia practiced by terrorist
organizations such as ISIS are rejected by the vast majority of Muslims as being
contrary to the Islamic ethos, views, doctrines, teaching, and culture. The
position of the most eminent religious leaders and even the OIC also crucially
condemn extremism. The best example is the position of the OIC on the bombing
of the two Buddhas of Bamiyan; the OIC attempted to persuade the Taliban not
to proceed with this act using Islamic law arguments. Following the destruction
of the statues, the Doha Conference of the ulemas on cultural heritage in Islam
was organized, and once more the ulemas condemned the act, concluding that
such destruction is prohibited under Islamic law.
Last but not least, Wahhabi doctrines and other movements that are hostile
199
Cf. Annex to the Doha Statement, in DOHA PROCEEDINGS, supra note 74, at 9–10 (highlighting the
values of dialogue, tolerance, and diversity).
200
Muslim Scholars’ Statement on Danish Cartoons Controversy, ISLAMIC NETWORK GRP., https://ing.
org/muslim-scholars-statement-on-danish-cartoons-controversy (last visited Sept. 7, 2021).
201
QUR’AN 16:125.
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toward the arts and the letters also seem to be rejected de facto in the Muslim
world—at least gradually. Even the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is eager today to
develop a modern and vibrant artistic and cultural scene and is especially active
within the UNESCO as well as the ALESCO and the ICESCO. What is clear,
therefore, is that the main question in this context is not whether or not the arts
are permissible. This question is beside the point. Rather, what is relevant is the
relief of artists, performers, and cultural institutions from tight regulation
imposed by state laws.202 Questions related to the legitimacy of the arts and the
need to safeguard cultural heritage, or even the veneration of shrines, should be
examined in the context of the specific circumstances where they appear (as in
the case where the Taliban exploded the two Buddhas or where Ansar Dine
ruined the Sufi shrines) and should be isolated as acts of terrorism.

202
Cf. Ulaby, supra note 186, at 215 (finding, for example, that “larger vertically integrated multi-media
companies have signed many singers in the region to exclusive contracts that tightly control what and where the
artists can record”); Cubelic, supra note 185, at 38 (noting censorship is limiting creativity). See generally Matt
J. Duffy, Arab Media Regulations: Identifying Restraints on Freedom of the Press in the Laws of Six Arabian
Peninsula Countries, 4 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 1, 6 (2014).

